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CHIE F JUDGE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF A PPEALS If<#~, 
FIFTH CIRCUIT tr 
July 14, 1989 (6 0 1) 353·0911 
245 EAST CAPITOL STREET, ROOM 302 
JACKSON , M I SSISSIPPI 39201 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL 
CHIEF JUDGE PAUL H. RONEY 
CHIEF JUDGE WM. TERRELL HODGES 
JUDGE BAREFOOT SANDERS 
PROFESSOR ALBERT M. PEARSON 
Dear Judges and Professor: 
I enclose a proposed modification of Professor Pearson's draft statute which 
incorporates most of the comments of Judges Hodges and Sanders. I also suggest a 
pro~ port by our committee which includes an analysis of the statistical data we 
haveonaha: Since these show the main delay occurs in federal ha5eas, I recom mend 
that we not keep the elaborate requirements for appointment of counsel or for federal 
approval as Judge Sanders suggests. This step may be added later if experience shows it 
is needed. I have also suggest a preamble to the legislation. It will, of course, be 
discarded in any bill, but should serve as a worthwhile introduction to members of 
Congress who might look at it. 
My hope is that this proposal will benefit our effort to achieve a committee 




cc: William R. Burchill, Jr. 
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Comnittee Report 
-~ I,. J 
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When Ch i ef Justice William H. Rehnquist formed this 
corrrnittee, h i s charge to us was to inquire into "the necessity 
and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay 
I 
--f.,_t ;,_z_ _ 
and the lack of finality" in capital cases in which the prisoner 
had or had been offered counsel. He specifically directed our 
attention to the following issues: (1) better coordination of • 
state and federal collateral procedures, (2) exhaustion, (3) 
/ 
expediting federal habeas corpus review, (4) a statute of 
limitations for collateral proceedings, and (5) lack of finality 
in the collateral process. We have examined statistical 
information, studied case histories, considered many articles 
published in leading journals, solicited and considered the views 
of a broad spectrum of organizations and attorneys interested in 
the area, and conferred extensively. Our report to the 
Conference follows. 
In 197 2 , Furman v.' 
~ ~1 V. ~ {Jc; 1 t,) I 1-/....tJ.._ 
&rut-r~~~tJ~ 
Geor ~ ia allowed states to impose the / 
,q,2 
death penal t y based on guid~jury discretion.A Since t-b.,Q.n, 1 there 
,A;:/11 A-V ~~ /'1_.f4,,~ ~I-~ /.1..~ 
[I£AL-AVY_  1--o ' 
~~µ . ~~~~~-H~Q~ 
~~ ~~~~~ C:.~u._ ~~. 
•·-- · •- ·~ ·.,,... •. ---- - • .- •. • • • - • _., , _.. - - -- .• •-.• ·---;--,...•-• •• ,-•---• .. ·--••- • - -n __ ,. 
" 
challenges in the state for~~- This results in delayed or 
ineffective federal collateral procedures. Other factors also 
contribute to the present process of difficult and unsatisfactory 
collateral adjudication. Prominent among them is the fact that 
the Su~ has handed down 2..1 dec l_sions affecting various 
phases of death penalty litigation since Furman. Until the 
recent decision in Teague limited the effect of new precedent on 
a,.... ~ ~
long pending litigation, ffitl-A.Y of these decisions created new 
A. 
rules that spawned relitigation of settled collateral issues and 
the pending of such cases delayed the process of adjudication. 
Capital litigation must be improved if the death penalty 
~ 
remains a constitutional form of punishment for ~~l c~mrnra • 
proceedings. The Conrnittee's d-e-taile:tl analysis of cases from 
~ . 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% -
of the time spent in collateral litigation in death penalty cases 
---------.,_.,--'---- - rt - - - -
occurs outside of state collateral proceedings. A table showing 
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the average time periods and ratios in death penalty cases in 
these states is attached to this report. Underlying data is 
available from the reporter. 
No single reason for this disproportionately high federal 
\ 
percentage can be identified. The reconrnended legislation is 
~h 
designed to achieve a single state proceeding whieia exhausts all 
issues and, if necessary, is followed by a single federal habeas 
corpus action. To accomplish this goal, we are convinced that 
the petitioner must be represented in state post-conviction 
review by competent counsel who stays with the collateral 
proceedings through any federal court habeas corpus litigation. 
This goal can best be achieved with the initiative and 
cooperation of the 37 states that authorize imposition of the 
death penalty. We would hope that those governments would also 
take steps to make their trial and direct review process in death 
nu_ /.l...l-t:>--~  
penalty cases as error-free as possible.~ We bert"6.ll...e ths:y m.u.s..t 
~peterit counsel~~! petiti_oners for state 
11-~~,ls~,) 
co 11 ate r a 1 rev i ew. I f the s ~ th i Ag s .a r-e ~ fl"€ , fed er a 1 co 11 ate r a 1 
- 4 -
~~ ~~d,-~,, 
review proceedings~sho-ul-rJ ~-f.l..L• im_ue..d aAcL~0-1:ild pa.s ~ ialy ~ 
o-" eli111i1.ated. The single, well-counseled series of collateral 
proceedings we envision would best ensure that every proper issue 
~ 
i s r a i s e d and d e c i d e d i n t•h Q ma §..t o r de r 1 y way • 
A 
The legislation we propose to effectuate the one prompt, 
___,, 
counseled state/federal post-conviction process provides that 
~ 
 counsel 
~ Gp-llL~~  
is appointed by a state, a statute of limitations 
"'\ 
would begin to run as to all claims cognizable in federal 
ha b e a s . At t h i s t i me , an au t o ma t i c s t a y o f ex e c u t i on , i f n e e de d , 
could be obtained. This stay would remain in place until all 
collateral proceedings were completed. The prisoner would have 
~'i ~ ~ tJ..f 4--l--o.k ~~ 
six months within which to file in federal court. This 
~;. I • "\ 
~"'--
limitation assuref that the presentation of issues will not be 
I\ 
delayed. Time would 
~ 
s t~-~·'t"1,,. ['e...p,.g_..v--~...v,~,r-:-,... • n.Ato 11 ed during such 
.., 
state proceedings. th~o-p 
I\ 
When st ; te proceedings conclude/, 
would recorrmence ~d and any federal pet i tlon would 
~ 




unless petitioner could show a basis for relief that had not been 
presented, that a substantial question of guilt existed, that new ~r~~-1-
facts had been found, or that new fundamental rights had been 
I\. 
developed. Since 28 U.S.C. §§ 1657 and 2243 already require all 
federal habeas corpus proceedings to be expedited and decided 
"forthwith" and "sumnarily," no additional legislation requiring 
priorities for the handling of federal habeas corpus proceedings 
w..,L. ~ 4--1A-<f 4j~ I- ~r J-4. , ~ ~f-~ 





SU:'.!\fARY OF DEALTH PENALTY LITIGATION STATISTICS 
BASED ON 50 CASES FROM FLORIDA, TEXAS, 




End of state direct appeals 
Direct certiorari review by U.S. S. Ct. 
Execution 
Valid sentence to: 
End of state direct appeals 







Sentence to cert. on direct/sentence to execution 
Down time*/sentence to execution 
State collateral/sentence to execution 
Federal collateral/sentence to execution 
Total collateral/sentence to execution 
State collateral/total collateral 
Federal collateral/total collateral 
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PREAvIBLE 
Representation by competent counsel in all post-conviction 
proceedings for prisoners in state custody subject to a capital 
sentence would best ensure justice and minimize delay. Such 
representation is now available in all federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. This bill is intended to encourage states to make ---=--
such representation available to indigent prisoners in state 
post-conviction proceedings by eliminating unmeritorious, 
successive petitions and requiring prompt filing of habeas corpus 
-
claims in federal courts. Its goal is to achieve a more orderly 
post-conviction review process in both state and federal court 
that will both assure constitutional rights of capital sentenced 
prisoners and protect the interest of society in the meaningful 
enforcement of this constitutional punishment. 
Subchapter B. 
Section 2256 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Sentencing: Special 
Procedures 
[new] 
Habeas Corpus in capital sentences of prisoners 
in state custody; appointment of counsel 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under 
section 2254 of Title 28 involving prisoners in state custody who 
are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if 
indigent pri'soners have been offered the assistance of competent 
counsel at all stages of post-conviction proceedings authorized 
by the state. 
(b) For the provisions of this subchapter to apply to it, a 
state must establish and fund a resource center or equivalent to 
recruit, select, and compensate counsel in state post-conviction 
proceedings in cases involving state priosners under capital 
sentences. 
:r 
Section 2257 Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
If, during the pendency of any state or federal post-
convicton proceeding claiming the violation of a right arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a state 
issues a writ for the execution of a prisoner under a capital 
sentence who is represented by counsel, the writ shall be stayed 
by any district court in which habeas proceedings are pending or 
could be instituted. The stay shall expire automatically if 
counsel for the state prisoner fails to file a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the district court within~ days of 
the final judgment of the highest court of the state on direct 
appeal and through the time for filing a petition for certiorari 
in the Supreme Court of the United States after direct appeal, 
and, if such a petition be filed, through the date of final 
disposition of the petition. If a petition for habeas corpus is 
so filed, then the stay shall expire automatically upon final 
determination of such habeas corpus proceedings. 
The 180-day period provided shall be tolled during any 
- 3 -
period counsel has pending before a state court of competent 
jurisdiction a petition for post-conviction relief. 
No federal court thereafter shall have the authority to 
enter a stay of execution in the case unless: 
(l) ' the basis for the stay is a claim not previously 
presented in any state or federal court; 
(2) the facts underlying the claim are sufficient, if 
proven, to undermine substantially the court's confidence in the 
jury's determination of guilt on the underlying offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed; and 
(3) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable, or (C) based 
on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
... . :·. _,.· :. .__. __._, : . · .· 
through . the 'exercise of -. re·a~onable "·ailigE!nce in :time ·to present 
the claim for state or federal :post-conviction · review. 
- 4 
-· ·r...-. . , .. 
Section 2258 Filing of habeas corpuus petitions' time 
requirements; tolling rules 
Counsel appointed under section 2256 to represent a state 
prisoner under capital sentence must file any petition for habeas 
' 
corpus in the appropriate federal district court within 180 days 
from the effective date of appointment. The filing rule 
established by this section shall be tolled: 
(a) During the time period running from the date of the 
affirmance of the capital sentence on direct appeal by the 
highest court of the state through the time for filing of a 
petition for certiorari in the Snpreme Court; and, if counsel for 
the state priosoner files such a petition for certiorari, through 
the date of final disposition of the petition. 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-conviction 
· review pending before a state court of competent jurisdiciton; if 
all state filing rules are made in a timely manner, this period 
shall run continuously from the date that the state prisoner 
files a request for post-conviction review of his capital 
- 5 -
-.~ ... r ---- · ,_-. ~ ·.._ '• . 
J 
sentence in the court of conviction or other proper trial court 
until final disposition of the post-conviction review proceedings 
by the highest court of the state. The filing rule is not tolled 
during the pendency of certiorari proceedings in the Supreme 
Court of the United States related to such state collateral 
proceedings. 
(b) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
counsel for the state prisoner: (A) moves for an extension of 
time in the federal district court that would have proper 
jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of . a habeas corpus 
--· -· . 
petition and (B) makes a showing of good cause for counsel's 
inability to file the habeas corpus petition within the 60-day 
period established by this subsection. The moton for extension 
of time may not be filed prior to the completion of all state 
post-convict i on review of the validity of a capital sentence. 
- . '., ... 
r .·•·- -· ;. • ·,-' r . -~.,_,-~· • . "'':;1~-'t _¼,.. ·• L ._, 
'" . " ' :, _; ). , .f• •• - • ~. ~--·c• · •-:..7-;.. --~ 
.-:;. • 
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Section 2259 Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal review; 
exhaustion by a state prisoner under capital 
sentence. 
In . any habeas corpus proceeding under this subchapter a 
district court shall consider and rule upon any request for an 
evidentiary hearing and conduct any evidentiary hearing necessary 
to complete the record for the purpose of habaas review. [Upon 
the development of a complete evidentiary record, the district 
court shall rule on the merits of all claims properly before 
it] [Upon the development of a complete evidentiary record, the 
district court shall certify the record to the court of appeals 
as ripe for the adjudication of all claims properly before it]. 
[(c) Upon the receipt of a record from a district court in a 
case involving a state prisoner under capital sentence, the court 
of appeals shall proceed to consider and resolve all propoerly 
preserved and presented calims as if the case were on direct 
a pp ea 1 fr om a r u 1 i n g of . the · · d i s t r i c t co u r t adv e r s e : ·to t he .... 
. ~:':-~ . . : .. :;/~~-:-~·':: , .. -:-~-:·: ... ·. . . 
petitioner on all ·claims, · including any request for an 
evidentiary hearing where that request was denied by the district 
- 7 -
court.] 
Unexhausted claims shall not be considered by the district 
court and shall be dismissed by a district court under § 2254(b) 
or (c), unless the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop the claims in the state courts is (A) the result of state 
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable; or (C) based on a 
factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for 
state post-convction review. 
- 8 -
. ..:. ~.3. •. • . 
Section 2260 Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from a district court to a court of appeals does not 
apply to any habeas corpus proceeding subject to the provisions 
of this subchapter. 
• 




OFFICE OF THE 
ATlDRNEY GENERAL 
~ DoN S!EGELM AN 
W, A TTORNEY G ENERA L 
M ONTGOMERY, ALABAM A 36130 
(205) 261-7400 
SU 1 6 ,. 
-
-
STATE OF ALABAMA 
September 13, 1988 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I understand that you are involved in a study of the 
problem of delay and successive petitions in federal habeas 
proceedings, including those involving capital cases. Having 
handled post-conviction capital punishment litigation in 
Alabama for nine years, I am also concerned about those 
problems, and I have enclosed some materials relating to the 
subject. 
The enclosed execution chart lists the date of commission 
of the capital offense and the date of execution in each of the 
101 post-Furman executions. Of particular relevance are the 90 
executions which were non-consensual. 
Pages 5 and 6 of the enclosed capital data sheet list the 
average period of delay by state and by federal circuit. The 
capital data sheet also includes death row population data by 
state and by federal circuit. The death row population data is 
taken from the Legal Defense Fund's wDeath Row, U.S.A.w 
report. I have compiled the execution data independently. 
Also enclosed is an example of the orders which our 
Southern District issues in all first-time habeas proceedings 
involving death row inmates. Paragraphs 2 - 4 of the enclosed 
order is a more detailed version of the order originated by 
Judge Hand, which you commended in your speech to the Eleventh 
Circuit Judicial conference in 1983. See, 69 A.B.A.J. 1000 
{Aug. 1983). I believe that such orde~are helpful in 
reducing the number of claims raised in successive petitions, 
although they are obviously not a complete solution to the 
problem. 
I have the capital data sheet on a computer and I update 




Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
September 13, 1988 
Page Two 
If you wish, I will be glad to send you updated copies as they 
are produced. I would also be honored to assist in any other 
way you desire. 
Please forgive the impertinence of this unsolicited 
letter, but I do feel that the problem you are studying is a 
serious one. As Chief Judge Clark wrote for the Fifth Circuit 
in a successive petition case last year: 
The courts themselves have been slow to 
react to their new responsibility in 
today's death penalty cases. During the 
period when the Supreme Court of the United 
States interdicted capital punishment and 
sorted out the constitutional propriety of 
statutes and trial procedures, the 
population of death row in many states 
multiplied. That dam has broken, and the 
rush of cases is upon the courts. Justice 
requires that in each instance capital 
punishment be imposed with maximum 
assurance of scrupulous legality. But, 
justice equally demands an assurance that 
such punishment be imposed when the minds 
of men still retain memory of the crime 
committed. Otherwise, capital punishment 
becomes a sort of second, albeit legal, 
crime. 
•.. I write to plead for change to come and 
come quickly before respect for the law 
erodes beyond repair. 
Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 344 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 




























POST-FURMAN EXECUTION LIST 
compiled by: Assistant Alabama Attorney General 
Ed Carnes 
TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) 
Consent Jan. 17, 1977 Robbery-murder 
(July 20-21, 1975) 
Involuntary May 25, 1979 Murder 
(Feb. 4, 1973) 
consent Oct. 22, 1979 Robbery-murder 
(Dec. 20, 1977) 
Consent Mar. 9' 19 81 Rape-murder and 
Multiple murders 
(Apr. 28, 1979) 
Virginia Consent Aug. 10, 1982 Robbery-murder 
(Apr. 22, 1978) 
Texas Involuntary Dec. 7, 1982 Kidnap-murder 




Electric Cha i r 
Gas Chamber 
Electric Cha i r 
Electric Chair 
Lethal I n j ecti on 
- - -
INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CR I ME (& DATE ) METHOD 
Evans, John Alabama Involuntary Apr. 22, 1983 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Jan. 5 ' 1977) 
w 
--
Gray, Jimmy Mississippi Involuntary Sept. 2, 1983 Rape-murder Gas Chamber 
(June 25, 1976) 
w 
Sullivan, Robert Florida Involuntary Nov. 30, 1983 Robbery-murder Electric Cha i r 
(Apr. 9' 1973) 
w 
Williams, Robert Louisiana Involuntary Dec. 14, 1983 Robbery-murder Electr i c Chai r 
(Jan. 5 ' 1979) 
B ,. \ 
Smith, John Georgia Involuntary Dec. 15, 1983 Multiple murders Electric Cha i r 
for pecuniary gain 
(Aug. 31, 1974) 
w 
Antone, Anthony Florida Involuntary Jan. 26, 1984 Murder for hire Electric Chair 
(Oct. 23, 1975) 
w 
Taylor, Johnny Louisiana Involuntary Feb. 29, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Autry, James Texas Involuntary Mar. 14, 1984 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
(Apr. 20, 1980) 
w 
Hutchins, James North Involuntary Mar. 16, 1984 Murder of officers Lethal Injection 
Carolina (May 31, 1979) 
w 
O'Bryan, Ronald Texas Involuntary Mar. 31, 1984 Murder for Lethal Injection 
remuneration 
(Oct. 31, 1974) 
w 
Sonnier, Elmo Louisiana Involuntary Apr. 5' 1984 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
(Nov. 5' 1977) 
w 
Goode, Arthur Florida Involuntary Apr. 5' 1984 Sodomy-murder Electric Chair 
(Mar. 5 , 1976) 
w 
Adams, James Florida Involuntary May 10, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Nov. 12, 1973) 
B 
Shriner, Carl Florida Involuntary June 20, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Oct. 22, 1976) 
w 
3 
- - - .... 
INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Stanley, Ivon Georgia Involuntary July 11, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Apr. 12, 1976) 
B 
Washington Florida Involuntary July 13, 1984 Kidnapping-murder Electric Chair 
David Multiple murders 
(Sept. 20, 23, & 
27, 1976) 
B 
Dobbert, Ernest Florida Involuntary Sept. 7, 1984 Child abuse-murder Electric Chair 
(Dec. 31, 1971) 
w 
Baldwin, Timothy Louisiana Involuntary Sept. 10, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Apr. 4, 1978) 
w 
Henry, James Florida Involuntary Sept. 2 0, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Mar. 23, 1974) 
B 
Briley, Linwood Virginia Involuntary Oct. 12, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Knighton, Earnest Louisiana Involuntary Oct. 30 I 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Mar. 17, 1981) 
B 
Barefoot, Thomas Texas Involuntary Oct. 30, 1984 Murder of officer Lethal Injection 
(Aug. 7, 1978) 
w 
Barfield, Velma North Involuntary Nov. 2 I 1984 Murder by poison Lethal Injection 
Carolina (Feb. 3 I 1978) 
w 
Palmes, Timothy Florida Involuntary Nov. 8, 1984 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Oct. 4, 1976) 
w ,. \ 
Stephens, Alpha Georgia Involuntary Dec. 11, 1984 Burglary-murder Electric Chair 
Robbery-murder 
(Aug. 19, 197 4) 
B 
Willie, Robert Louisiana Involuntary Dec. 28, 1984 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
(May 28, 1980) 
w 
Martin, David Louisiana Involuntary Jan. 4, 1985 Multiple murders Electric Chair 
[4 victims] 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Green, Roosevelt Georgia Involuntary Jan. 9, 1985 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Kidnap-murder 
(Dec. 12, 1976) 
B 
Shaw, Joseph South Involuntary Jan. 11, 1985 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Carolina Multiple murders 
[ 2 victims] 
(Oct. 29, 1977) 
w 
Skillern, Doyle Texas Involuntary Jan. 16, 1985 Murder of officer Lethal Injection 
(Oct. 23, 1974) 
w 
Raulerson, James Florida Involuntary Jan. 30, 1985 Murder of officer Electric Chair 
(Apr. 27, 1975) 
w 
Solomon, Georgia Involuntary Feb. 20, 1985 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
Roosevelt (June 17, 1979) 
B 
Witt, Johnny Florida Involuntary Mar. 6, 1985 Kidnapping-murder Electric Chair 
(Oct. 28, 1973) 
w 
Morin, Stephen Texas Consent Mar. 13, 1985 Kidnapping-murder Lethal Injection 




INMATE STATE TYP~ DATE CRIME ( & DATE) METHOD 
Young, John Georgia Involuntary Mar. 20, 1985 Burglary-murder & Electric Chair 
Multiple-murders 
(Dec. 7 , 1974) 
B 
Briley, James Virginia Involuntary Apr. 18, 1985 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Multiple murders 
[ 2 victims] 
(Oct. 19, 1979) 
B 
De La Ros~ Texas Involuntary May 15, 1985 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
Jesse (Aug. 22, 1979) 
H 
Francois, Marvin Florida Involuntary May 29, 1985 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
Multiple murders 
(July 27, 1977) 
B 
Milton, Charles Texas Involuntary June 25, 1985 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
(June 24, 1977) 
B 
Mason, Morris Virginia Involuntary June 25, 1985 Rape-murder Electric Chair 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Porter, Henry Texas Involuntary July 9, 1985 Murder of officer Lethal Injection 
(Nov. 29, 1975) 
H 
Rumbaugh, Texas Consent Sept. 11, 19 85 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
Charles (Apr. 4, 1975) 
w 
Vandiver, Indiana Consent Oct. 16, 1985 Murder for hire Electric Chair 
William (Mar. 20, 1983) 
w 
Cole, Carroll Nevada Consent Dec. 6, 19 85 Murder by previ- Lethal Injec tion 
ously convicted 
murderer 
( May 14, 19 7 7) 
w 
Roach, James South Involuntary Jan. 10, 1986 Rape-murder Electric Cha i r 
Carolina Multiple murders 
(Oct. 29, 1977) 
w 
Bass, Charles Texas In voluntary Mar. 12, 1986 Murder of officer Lethal Injection 
(Aug. 16, 1979) 
w 
Jones, Arthur Alabama In voluntary Mar. 21, 1986 Robbery-murder Electric Cha i r 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Thomas, Daniel Florida Involuntary Apr. 15, 1986 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
(Jan. 1, 1976) 
B 
-
Barney, Jeffrey Texas Consent Apr. 16, 1986 Rape-murder Lethal Injection 
(Nov. 24, 1981) 
w 
--
Funchess, David Florida Involuntary Apr. 22, 1986 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
Multiple murders 
(Dec. 16, 1974) 
B 
Pinkerton, J. Texas Involuntary May 15, 1986 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
Kelly Burglary-murder 
(Oct. 26, 1979) 
w 
Straight, Ronald Florida Involuntary May 20, 1986 Robbery-murder Electric Chair' 
(Oct. 4, 1976) 
w 
Esquivel, Rudy Texas Involuntary June 9, 1986 Murder of officer Lethal Injection 
(June 8, 1978) 
H 
Brock, Kenneth Texas Involuntary June 19, 1986 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Bowden, Jerome Georgia Involuntary June 24, 1986 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Dec. 8, 1976) 
B 
Smith, Michael Virginia Involuntary July 31, 1986 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
(May 23, 1977) 
B 
Woolls, Randy Texas Involuntary Aug. io, 1986 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
(June 16, 1979) 
w 
Smith, Larry Texas Involuntary Aug. 22, 1986 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
(Feb. 3, 1978) 
B 
,_ \ 
Wicker, Charles Texas Involuntary Aug. 26, 1986 Kidnapping-murder Lethal Injection 
(Apr. 4, 1980) 
w 
Rook, John North Involuntary Sept. 19, 1986 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Carolina (May 12, 1980) 
w 
Evans, Michael Texas Involuntary Dec. 4, 1986 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Andrade, Richard Texas Involuntary Dec. 18, 1986 Rape-murder Lethal Injection 
(Mar. 20, 1984) 
H 
Hernandez, Ramon Texas Involuntary Jan. 30, 1987 Burglary-murder Lethal Injection 
(June 19, 1980) 
H 
Moreno, Eliseo Texas Consent Mar. 4, 1987 Murder of officer Lethal Injection 
Multiple murders 
(Oct. 11, 1983) 
H 
Mulligan, Joseph Georgia Involuntary May 15, 1987 Multiple murders Electric Chair 
[2 victims] 
(Apr. 14, 1974) 
B 
Johnson, Edward Mississippi Involuntary May 20, 1987 Rape-murder Gas Chamber 
(June 2, 1979) 
B 
Tucker, Richard Georgia Involuntary May 22, 1987 Kidnapping-murder Electric Chair 
Robbery-murder 



























May 28, 1987 
May 29, 1987 
June 7, 1987 
June 9, 1987 
June 12, 1987 
June 16, 1987 
-
CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Rape-murder Lethal Inject i on 
Kidnapping-murder 
Robbery-murder 
(June 12, 1978) 
Kidnapping-murder Electric Chair 
Robbery-murder 
(Aug. 20-21, 1977) 
Robbery-murder 
(Jan. 30, 1978) 
Rape-murder 
Robbery-murder 















INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Johnson, Elliott Texas Involuntary June 24, 1987 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
Multiple murders 
(2 victims] 
(Apr. 8, 1982) 
B 
Whitley, Richard Virginia Involuntary July 6, 1987 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(July 25, 1980) 
w 
Thompson, John Texas Involuntary July 8, 1987 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
(May 21, 1977) 
w 
Evans, Connie Mississippi Involuntary July 8, 1987 Robbery-murder Gas Chamber 
(Apr. 8, 1981) 
B 
Celestine, Louisiana Involuntary July 21, 1987 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Willie (Sept. 13, 1981) 
B 
Watson, Willie Louisiana Involuntary July 24, 1987 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Robbery-murder 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Brogdon, John Louisiana Involuntary July 30, 1987 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
(Oct. 7' 1981) 
w 
-
Rault, Sterling Louisiana Involuntary Aug. 24, 1987 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Kidnapping-murder 
Multiple murders 
(Mar. 1, 1981) 
w 
Selby, Pierre Utah Involuntary Aug. 28, 1987 Robbery-murder Lethal Inject i on 
Rape-murder 
Multiple murders 
(Apr. 22, 1974) 
B 
Ritter, Wayne Alabama Involuntary Aug. 28, 1987 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Jan. 5, 1977) 
w 
White, Beauford Florida Involuntary Aug. 28, 1987 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
Multiple murders 
(July 27, 1977) 
B 
Mitchell, Georgia Involuntary Sept. 1, 1987 Robbery-murder Electric Cha i r 




INMATE STATE TYPE DATE CRIME ( & DATE) METHOD 
Starvaggi, Texas Involuntary Sept. 10, 1987 Robbery-murder Lethal Injection 
Joseph (Jan. 28, 1977) 
w 
McCorquodale, Georgia Involuntary Sept. 2 !', 1987 Rape-murder Electric Chair 
Timothy (Jan. 16, 1974) 
w 
Streetman, Texas Involuntary Jan. 7_, 1988 Burglary-murder Lethal Injection 
Robert (Dec. 17, 1982) 
w 
Darden, Willie Florida Involuntary Mar. 15, 1988 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Sept. 8, 1973) 
B ,. , 
Felde, Wayne Louisiana Involuntary Mar. 15, 1988 Murder of Officer Electric Chair 
(Oct. 20, 1978) 
w 
Lowenfield, Louisiana Involuntary Apr. 13, 1988 Multiple murders Electric Chair 
Leslie (Aug. 30, 1982) 
B 
Clanton, Earl Virginia Involuntary Apr. 14, 1988 Robbery-murder Electric Chair 

































June 10, 1988 
June 14, 1988 
July 28, 1988 
-
CRIME (& DATE) METHOD 
Sexual Assault on Lethal Inject i on 
children murder(s) 
(Oct. 16, 1979 -
July 14, 1983) 
Robbery-murder Electric Chair 
(Aug. 14, 1984) 
Kidnapping-murder Electric Chair 





SUMMARY OF POST-FURMAN 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DATA 
Prepared By: Assistant Alabama Attorneys General 
Ed Carnes and Sandra Stewart 
Alabama State House 
11 South Union Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
205/261-7408 
{Death Row Data current through August 1, 1988); 
{Execution Data current through September 11, 1988)* 
I. Number on Death Row Nationally: 2110** 
II. 
{37 states and the federal military with capital 
statutes; 34 states and the federal military with death 
row inmates) 
Death Row Population by State 
Rank State Number % of Nat'l Total -
1 Fl or ida 284 13% 
2 Texas 269 13% 
3 California 226 11% 
4 Illinois 116 5% 
5 Georgia 108 5% 
6 Pennsylvania 101 5% 
7 Alabama 95 4% 
8 Oklahoma 93 4% 
9 Ohio 86 4% 
10 Arizona 84 4% 
*neath row state-by-state data from LDF's August 1, 
1988 •Death Row, U.S.A.• report; execution data compiled 
·independently. 
**The national death row population total is 11 less 
than the sum of state and the sum of federal circuit death row 
population figures, because a few inmates are under death 
sentences in more than one state. 
Rank State Nu mber % o f Nat'l Total -
11 North Carolina 79 4% 
- 12 Tennessee 70 3% 13 Missouri 61 3% 
14 Mississippi 48 2% 
15 Indiana 48 2% 
16 Nevada 44 2% 
17 Louisiana 42 2% 
18 South Carolina 41 2% 
19 Virginia 37 2% 
20 Kentucky 33 2% 
21 Arkansas 31 1% 
22 New Jersey 28 1% 
23 Maryland 19 1% 
24 Idaho 16 1% - 25 Nebraska 12 1% 
26 Oregon 12 1% 
27 Delaware 7 * 
28 Washington 7 * 
29 Montana 6 * 
30 Utah 6 * 
31 Colorado 3 * 
32 Federal 
Military 3 * 
33 Wyoming 3 * 
34 New Mexico 2 * 


























III. Death Row Population by Federal Circuit: 
Circuit Number 
Eleventh Circuit 487 
Ninth Circuit 395 
F if th C i r cu it 359 
S ix th C i r cu it 189 
Fourth Circuit 176 
seventh Circuit 164 
Thi rd Circuit 136 
Tenth Circuit 107 
Eighth Circuit 104 
Second Circuit 1 
F i rs t C i r cu i t 0 



























V. Number of Post-Furman Execut i ons (includ i ng consensual 
ones) by State: 
Rank State Number % of Nat'l Total 
1 Texas 27 27% 
2 Florida 18 18% 
3 Louisiana 18 18% 
4 Georgia 13 13% 
5 Virginia 7 7% 
6 North Carolina 3 3% 
7 Mississippi 3 3% 
8 Alabama 3 3% 
9 Utah 3 3% 
10 Indiana 2 2% 
11 Nevada 2 2% 
12 South Carolina 2 2% 
101 
VI. Number of Post-Furman Executions (including consensual 
ones) by Federal Circuit: 
circuit Number % of Nat'l Total 
Fifth Circuit 48 48% 
El~venth Circuit 34 34% 
Fourth Circuit 12 12% 
Tenth Circuit 3 3% 
Ninth Circuit 2 2% 







VI I. Number of Post-Furman Involuntary Executions by 
Federal Circuit: 
Circuit Number % of Nat'l Total 
F if th C i r cu i t 44 49% 
Eleventh Circuit 34 38% 
F OU rt h C i r cu it 11 12% 
Tenth Circuit 1 1% 
-
Total 90 
VIII. Time Between Date of Crime and Execution in the 90 Post-
Furman Involuntary Executions 
IX. 
(11 of the 101 executions were by consent or without 
active opposition by the inmate executed): 
- the time has ranged from 2 years and 9 months 
(Andrade case in Texas) to 14 years and 6 months 
(Darden case in Florida); and 
- the average time has been 7 years and 11 months 
Average Time Between Date of Crime and Involuntary 
Execution State-by-State: 
State Number Avera.s_e Time 
Texas 23 7 years and 8 months 
Florida 18 9 years and 9 months 
Louisiana 18 5 years and io months 
Georgia 13 9 years and 10 months 
Virginia 6 6 years and 10 months 
North Carolina 3 5 years and 11 months 
Alabama 3 7 years and 1 month 
Mississippi 3 7 years and 2 months 
South Carolina 2 7 years and 9 months 
Utah 1 13 years and 4 months 
-





X. Average Time Between Date of Crime and Involuntary 
Execution in Federal Circuit: 
XI. 




6 years and 9 months 
6 years and 10 months 
13 years and 4 months 
9 years and 6 months 
Post-Furman Executions by Year 
Involuntar1_ Consensual Total Percenta9e of 
Post-Furman Total 
19 77 0 1 1 1% 
1978 0 0 0 0% 
1979 1 1 2 2% 
1980 0 0 0 0% 
1981 0 1 1 1% 
1982 1 1 2 2% 
1983 5 0 5 5% 
1984 . 21 0 21 21% 
1985 14 4 18 18% 
1986 17 l 18 18% 
1987 24 l 25 25% 
1988 
(to date) 7 l 8 8% 








IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 








vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 85-0775-C 
) 
WILLIE JOHNSON, Warden, 
Holman Unit, and FRED SMITH, 
Commissioner, Alabama 







ORDER REGARDING SCHEDULING OF 
CAPITAL HABEAS CORPUS ACTION 
' 'I . '-
'If '~ \ u " J 
On June 6, 1985, the petitioner filed this action seeking to 
have the court issue a writ of habeas corpus. 
It is ORDERED that the following procedure and schedule 
shall apply to this action: 
1. Respondent shall a$ soon as practicable, but in any 
event on or before July 10, 1985, file and serve upon counsel for 
the petitioner (unless it is established by direct contact with 
counsel for the petitioner that he or she already has these 
materials) the following materials: 
(a) Transcripts of state court trial 
proceedings, including but not limited to: 
(1) Voir dire proceedings; 
(2) Opening statements; 
(3) Testimony; 







(6) Post trial motions; 
(7) Post trial orders. 
Cb) Appellant's and appellee's briefs 
on direct appeal to the State's appellate 
courts, as well as copies of all opinions, 
orders and transcripts of the State's 
appellate courts proceedings. 
Cc) Petitioner's and respondent's 
briefs on collateral appeal to the State's 
appellate courts, as well as copies of all 
opinions, orders and transcripts of the 
State's appellate courts proceedings. 
Cd) Copies of all pleadings, opinions 
and orders in any previous federal habeas 
corpus actions filed by the petitioner which 
arose from the same conviction. 
(e) A checklist of all materials 
described in paragraphs Ca) through Cd) of 
this section 1 which are filed with the 
court, such checklist to be in the form 
required by the court's Standing Order 
hereinafter referred to. Such materials are 
to be marked and numbered so that they can be 
uniformly referred to. Respondent shall 
serve this checklist upon counsel for the 
petitioner and take whatever steps are 








counsel for the petitioner has are marked and 
-numbered in exactly the same manner as are 
the copies filed with the court. 
If any items identified in (a), (b), Cc) 
and Cd) above are not available, respondent 
shall specifically so state and shall state 
when, if at all, such missing material can be 
filed. 
2. Counsel for petitioner, as an officer of this court, 
shall, within fifteen (15) days after servicel of the 
materials required to be served by counsel for respondent under 
section 1 above,2 hold a conference with the petitioner. 
Counsel will at this conference: (a) advise the petitioner that 
the court will not accept successive petitions and that if there 
are grounds existing at the time of the conference for the . 
granting of a writ that all such grounds must be forthwith statec 
in appropriate pleadings and any failure to do so will constitutE 
a waiver of omitted ground or grounds; (b) review with petitione1 
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United State~ 
District Courts; and Cc) explore as fully as possible al: 
lcomputation of any time period prescribed by this ordei 
shall be in conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. 
2rf Counsel for the petitioner takes the position tha 
counsel for the respondent has not complied with the requirement . 
of section 1 of this order within the time fixed for compliance 
counsel for the petitioner shall immediately notify the court i 








potential grounds for relief including, but not limited to, the 
following:-
1. The right to remain silent and to 
not incriminate oneself was violated; 
2. Miranda warnings were not given or 
not given properly; 
3. Government agents or informers 
deliberately elicited incriminating 
statements, see Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964); 
4. There was an impermissibly 
suggestive line-up, show-up, photo array, or 
in-court identification; 
5. The confession was not voluntary; 
6. The guilty plea was not voluntary; 
7. There was . breach of the plea 
bargain; 
8. Defendant was not mentally or 
physically competent to stand trial; 
9. There was prejudicial pre-trial or 
trial publicity; 
10. Jurors saw defendant in jail 
clothes; 
11. The grand jury or trial jury was 
selected in an unconstitutional fashion; 
12. There was not a speedy trial; 







14. Defendant was twice put in jeopardy; 
15. Defendant did not have effective 
counsel; 
16. Defendant was not able to confront 
the witnesses against him; 
17. Defendant was not able to compel the 
attendance of witnesses; 
18. There was such a lack of evidence of 
guilt that no rational trier of fact could 
have found the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt; 
19. The jury charge deprived defendant 
of the presumption of innocence; 
20. A more severe punishment was imposed 
on the second sentencing; 
21. The severity of the sentence was 
disproportionate to the crime; and 
22. Defendant was denied an effective 
appeal. 
Counsel and petitioner are reminded that there is a1 
obligation not to state spurious grounds or otherwise abuse thi 
process of this court and that any pleading filed herein will bi 
governed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within fifteen (15 
days after service of the materials required to be served b 
counsel for respondent under section 1 above, prepare and f i 1 







as we 11 as counsel's, which shall: (a) affirm that the 
discussion- required by section 2 of this order has taken place; 
Cb) affirm that petitioner understands fully that any failure to 
amend or state additional grounds for habeas relief· shall 
constitute a waiver of those grounds ; ( c ) certify that the 
petitioner is fully satisfied with the representation by his 
attorney in this action and waives any complaint as to such 
attorney's competency to represent him or asks the court for 
appropriate relief; and Cd) acknowledge that the petitioner 
understands that he has a duty to inform the court at any time 
that he becomes dissatisfied with his counsel's representation in 
this action and that his failure to so inform the court will 
constitute· a waiver of any claim based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel in this action. 
4 • Petitioner shall, within fifteen (15) days after service 
of the materials required to be. served by counsel for respondent 
under section 1 above, amend the original petition to allege each 
and every Constitutional violation or deprivation that may 
en tit 1 e the petitioner to habeas relief. If no amendment is to 
be filed, a notice to that effect shall accompany the memorandun 
referred to in section 3. 
5. Respondent shall file an answer to the petition withir 
twenty (20) days after the filing of the amended petition or, i1 
notice is filed that the petition will not be amended, withir 
twenty (20) days after the filing of such notice. Responden 1 
shall include in the answer those matters contemplated by Rule 1 







other relevant papers not already filed that are not specifically 
covered by the requirements of Rule 5. 
6. Within ten (10) days after the respondent has filed the 
answer the parties shall submit briefs (appropriately referenced 
to the record or supplemented record) which shall not be in 
excess of fifty (50) typewritten pages, doubled spaced on letter 
size paper, specifying their respective positions in the 
premises. 
7. No discovery shall be had without leave of court. It 
shall be petitioner's burden to demonstrate that State 
proceedings were not adequate to provide a full, fair evidentiary 
hearing. Failure to so do will result in this court's 
examinatio·n only of the evidence and matters presented by the 
record in the State Courts. Any request for an evidentiary 
hearing shall be made within the time allowed for briefing. At 
that juncture the court will give due consideration to whether 
or not an evidentiary hearing shall be held. 
8. If counsel for petitioner determines that there are an~ 
unexhausted claims for which a State remedy is still available, 
counsel shall immediately file with the court a designation of 
the claim and available remedy and shall seek whatever order fron 
this court counsel and petitioner deem appropriate. 
shall reply to any such motion within ten (10) days. 
Respond en 1 
9. The Standing Order of this Court dated April 24, 1985 
establishing certain uniform procedures for disposition of Habea: 
Corpus petitions in capital cases Ca copy of which is attached 







DONE this~ day of June, 1984. 
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,· ' ' ., 
' ,, .- • ... ·•·· ........ . . ..._ __ _ ., 
~•• Ad Boe Committee Report on Habeas Statutes . 
l)ear '1u_dg11 
· Prom my atu!y that I mtnt1oned to 10~ on the phone, I 
h•"• 1ome serious concerns about: ·the prcpo•al Of the 
Committee. ror yo~r information l «m transmitting a brief 
memorandum which outlines these tho~qht1. - . -
. -.- . _.,. . . . . .. . . 
\ 
For -the rea1on1 expla1n•d therein,? will not be able 
to join in the report ree~mmending the at~tutory change 
proposed by the Committee. 1........:__ 
. 
It was goo~ to v!eit w1,h iou ana I iook forward to 
seein; you at the Confetence. 
-~ ~ WJ 
, Jr, 
. 
~ 1-:L~ 7 (G )t::>) 
,.u,wo .. , 
cHllll•'IH• "' ,. .... ,. 
J 
., • 202 53:j ~ I.., J l"UQ••- • . 
SEP .18 '89 141 15 HCLLa4A't', 0-UEF' .JUDG£, 1ral'H CIRC 
P.Cfl 
wrt~ full dafarence to th• • tud1ou1 eftorts and th• proposal 
o! th• A4 Hoc C~mmittee on redtral Habeas Corpu1 ln cap1tal~a111, 
w• m~•t respectfully di1a9~ee with th• Report. The Committee haa 
cbviously given thorough and exhauative c0n1ideration to many 
ptob1ems in the operation o! the habeas statutes. Their 
commendable conoerna about tht adequacy ~! representation of 
indigent ~eath row d•!1ndante are particularly manifest in thl 
innovative au9~estiona in the Report. 
We, neverthele11,& must txpress our ! Pe~ial_ obj~ t!c~ to 
proposed Stction 22!7(c)(3) of !itle 28. That lijbsection would 
deprive a federal habeas court o! any authority to iaau• a stay or 
' axecution or any hab••• relief even though the court'• con!14ence 
in the determination o! the aentencet ta impose a ~enalty at death 
_.-J, / -la undertllined by _ a ahowing baaed on a fac~ual. predicate- that eo.uld 
not have 'been discovered earller through the exercia~ - ot 
. . 
reasonable diligence in time to praaent the claim far atate or 
flde_.ral t,oat-coi,.viotion review, · C9corid, we llkewiee have serious 
concern• about the aix-moftth time bar imposed by proposed I 2258. 
Thia mech•nical time-bar runs courtter to established equita~l• 
prlnoi~les whieh have ttaditlonally been applied with respect to 
the Great Writ. 
:,; 
. 
~he committee concludes that it t~ere is any doubt about the 
llhtenclng ph•se of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
stat• priso~er•• initial attempt to obtain post-eonviction revle~. 
O! course, repetitive habeas proceedings should be ~voided and it 
11 desirable that a11 claims challengin9 both the determination of 
1 
8 202 535 0350 C J ROB I NS0-1 
09/18/89 15:28 00:S 
st:P.11•8914:16 .n.t.a.iAV, OilEf' JUDGt, 1911'i CIRC 
P.93 
9ullt an4 th• aenterte1 be aaaetted in the very earliest Ph••• of 
any direct appeal ot po•t-convlction proceedings ; N,vertheless, 
•• noted below, there have been numero~• l~stance1 where the 
. !aotual pre~lcate for 1 1ub1tantial con1t1tutional clal~ could not 




lt ia for this compellin9 reason that the Committee -
in ptoposed Section 2257(2) tor the asaertton 
of - of violation of the Constit~tion or --- ___.....,,,. .-'\ ~ ~ 
State• for relief from a gu11ty verdict where, such claims are -
ba1e4 on a factual predlo•te that QQUld not have been discovered 
thtough the ex1rcise ct r•asonable d111gertce in time for ~tate or 
federal post-conviction tevl•~• Nevertheless, section 2257(3) 
I\ \, 
would deny any reliet wh1re only th• death sen~tnce and _not the 
guilty verdl6t, ls undermlned -by auch a ahowin9. --- --- --- -
'Brady_-v • . Mar,Yland, _ 373 u.s. 83 (196:3), h•ld -that , 11 the 
1uppre11lon by the prosecution -of ev14ence favor~ble to an ~ccused . .. - .- - . 
upon request viclites due process where the tv1denee la material 
either to guilt os ,to punla~ment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the proaecutiort.u (Emphasia .dded). ~ alag, 
United State1, v. Aqur1. 42? u.s. g7 (1976). Thus the 
constitutional rule clearly calla for relief in clrcumstanoea -
where the @xttema penalty itself la thrown in doubt, even though 
the conviction may ~ot be so undermined. Io the margin we note a 
number O! ca&eA wh .. ,. .. r.n,u•+-• h•n• b••n C10J'l\pe11•• lao •• 1:. ""'4e 
judgment• in erimlna1 c~~ea beoause of ltfd? vic1at1ons, 1 Artd 
l 
See,~, ~lio v, Onltod Stattl, 405 o.s. 
Onlt•dlt~tes v. offa, 43rr.2d 11 (5tn Cir. 1971), 
402 U.S. 988 (l971) J Dowen, v. M&Ynt~, 799 F.2d 593 
,QJr~. ~,!,!',led, ,1g U,s. 962 (l986)r United.states e 
(Footnott continue 
• 




on nl!xt page) 
a . 
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aeveral o! them have been caae1 where a daath penalty alone waa 
undermin14.2 
In cirg~m•tance• where the pe~alty determin•tio~ •lone ls 
thus akewe4, we ~ust vi~orouslv di•aqree with the Rap~~;•• 
recommendation to deny a11 authority to the feder&l cQutts to 
itAnt r9liet in au~oequent poat•,Qnvlction proeeedln~s. Denial of 
relief wh• re newly 41acovered m1t1iating evidence coul~ ~e shown 
woul4 tun directly counter to the principle that "the 11nsene•r in 
saRi tal CBS~!.. n\U,,.1, be perMitted· to consider an~ relevant 
mitlgatins.ffctor ••• •" Eddl~gl v.,Qkl&homa, 455 u.s. 104, 112 
(1982) (empnasia ~dde4)1 !!! ~laQ 1enry v. Lyhaugh, _ u.s. _, 
109 s.ct. 2934, 25»461 57 u. s. ii, w. 49sa, 4962 (1989) . (citing 
J~din91 and its princlpl• that "a sentencer may not b• precluded 
from considering •~4 may not refuse to consider •ny r•levant 
mitigating ~~idenoe ottered bf the defendant as the _baai~ tot & 
••nten~e l~se th•n death.•).3 Whe~• a Brad! v1ola~ion oc~ura and 
· .... ·re.eults ..-in th_a 1uppresslon of miticjating evidence, or evidence · 
underm1n1ni an •~gravatln9 circumat1nce, the extreme penalty woul~ 
875 
!tt, 1.J..i.!.1 Chaney v, Brown, ?30 F.2d 1334, 1358 (10th Cir. 
1984), 2ettL denied,~26§ U.S. 1090 (1984)r United Stlt§8 ex rel& 
Almf!j! v. paldl, 1§~ P,2d 815, 819-820 (3r~ Cit, 1952), cer~L 
!aft e, 345 u.s. 904 (l953)J Ornd rr v. Lockhar, 707 F, Supp. 
l062 (E.D. Ark. l988)J iohards • r or , 546 So.2d 1037 (rla. · 
1989)1 L!jhtboµrne v., Uiger, NOi. 73609, 73612, slip op. {tla. 
Jul~ 20, i§). 
3 
See ,t;2• Dutton v. Br~\1.!l• . 812 F.2~ 5g3 (10th Cir. 1987) (en 
b•nc), cer denitcl, _ u •• _, 108 S.Ct. 116 (1~87). 
3 
. -: 9 202 535 0350 CJ ROBINSCN t:)';11'].tyC,:, J.;;J i ,.~ .......... . . SEP.18 '89 14117 HOt.La.Rf, OiIEF' JUDGE, 10TH ClRC p,e,s 
b•· eair1ed out ln violation o! the ptlnolple of ~1ady that due 
proc111 is den1e4 where sup~~eaae4 ev1denQ• 9oes to guilt gx, 
punishment, and o! ~Aings, whioh ~uacanteea that !ll miti9ating 
evidence muat be coneldeted. 
It would al10 b• diatrc11in; for relle~ to be unavailable 
wh•r• • death p•nalty ls obtained in violat1Qn of Napue v~ 
Illinois, 360 U.1, 264, 259 (1959), which recognize~ that "it 11 
e1tabllshed that a conviction obtairted through use of false 
evlde~ce, known to be such ~y cepre~• htative5 ot the St«te, must 
fall under the rourteenth Amendment •• , •" ~ !l!2 Giglio y. 
United 8tatea, 405 u.s. 150, 154~5S (1972) (undiaoloaed promi9a of 
leniency made to key pros1cution witness in return !or hi• 
te1tlmony violates d~• process requitemantt &nunciat•d in Napu9)1 
Mjllet v. Patt·, 3SS u.s. 1 (19$7) (proaeeution'a delibar~te uee of 
false •vi.dence not 
commenced). Again, 
diacoverec! u.nt11 a,cond habeas proceeding 
both DJ&!y violations •nd li•PU v1clation,, 
first ·established by later diacovered evidence, are cat•• where a 
eo~•titutional claim challengini the sentence alone could not be 
h~ard by a fedexal h~b111 court if the proposal of sectloA 2~S? 
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W• must also e~press out concern a• to the desirability of 
the propose4 six-month period ln which t~• federal habeas petition 
mu,t be f1la4, Although 1mplementat~on or thla limitation 1• 
t«o111tata4 by the provision for counael an4 the carefully dtatted 
to111n~ prov1•1o~~, th• filing pe~iod itself nevertheless remalna 
a ri~i~ limitAticn. such a mec~anlcal prov1a1on is not in harmony 
with the re~atd for the Gt~at Writ ~hlch hhaa tra~ltionally been 
. 
reg.arded aa governed by equitable prihclples, 11 Fay x, Noia, 372 
u.1. 391, 438 (1963) (citing ynited Statea ex rel Smith v. Bald!, 
344 u.a. 561, 573 (1953) (ttankfurter, ~-3., di5eenting)), 
Conai•tently with auch e~uitable principle1, Rule 9 ot the a~les 
Covernlng Babeaa Corpua Petition• under 28 o.s.c. S 2254 alreadr 
irov1des protectloft for ~h• atates against prejudice re1ul~ing 
trom the ••••rtion ot untimely .or I\ICc••aiv~ petitions_. Ttli• 
railef 1eema adequAte and conalatent with the history ot the writ. 
0~• extremely diaturbinQ aituation must ba nQttd rel1t1d to 
tht time bar proposed, If A defendant under a death lentenct were· 
denle4 requested and properly admissible St•dy material t~at 
ltrongly au~ported a m1ti~ating circurnatance or •erioua1y 
undermined an •g~ravat1n9 cire~m1tance, an~ 1~ that evidence was. 
not dlcoo~•t•d within the 180 day time bat ot 5 2258, then a 
federal court would be powerless u~dar 5 2257 to gr&nt a stay or 
• 
any habeas ttli@t a;ainst a serio~1ly que1ti0nable death aentence. 
If t~• evid•nce d14 not r•late to ths ~ullty verdict no rtliet 
would bt p0•1ible. tt 1• • diatreasing contrad!otion that 
ata~ut•• of limltAtiona in gl~il ca1es have tolling exceptions. 
that permit one to ~11ert a claim to recover his ptoperty when & 
wron9 eonceal•d by ftaud 11 discovered, and yet under th~ proposed 
.. 
... _...._ ...-- - - - -~--- -·~ - -
• 
SEP,18 '89 14:19 l-n.L~• CHIEF" JUDGE• 10TH CIRC P.07 
habeas ~ta~uta one teokin9 to••~ aald• h1a death • enteno• on th• 
ground of a qonatitutional violation undermining the sentence 
alone would b• denied rel1tf, although his v1:y life ia at atake, 
we mu•t, therefore, respectfully disagree with the 
Committa••• report and cannot join 1n recommendin9 l~Qh ~tatutory 
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October 11, 1988 
r~~~~;_;;t,-
J w-iL.-6  Jr~ 
~ ~~ 11/-:30 
Re: Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Justice Keith Callow of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington, in his capacity as a member of an ABA committee on 
the judiciary, has been working with me and with Bob Fiedler, the 
AO Legislative Affairs Officer, on the issue of federal 
intercircuit conflicts. In the course of a recent telephone 
conversation on that subject, Justice Callow also mentioned that 
his court was looking at the death penalty post-conviction relief 
situation at the state level. I told Justice Callow about your 
commit tee and its work, and h e has sent to- me some materials in 
that regard that may be of some use or interest to your 
committee. A copy of Justice Callow's letter and its enclosures 
are enclosed. 
Sin7:;:__ 
Noel J. Augustyn 
NJA:pmt 
cc: Bill Burchell 
, . 
'Qffrt ~u.prtme <!Jourt 
~mu cf ... Mlfingtc-n 
KEITH M. CALLOW 
JUSTICE 
MAIL STOP AV-II 
OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON 
98504-0511 
October 6, 1988 
Mr. Robert E. Feidler 
Legislative & Public Affairs Officer 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
Washington, D.C. 20544 
Mr. Noel Augustyn 
Administrative Assistant 
to the Chief Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Bob and Noel: 
(206) 7S3-5085 
SCAN 234-5085 
I am enclosing to both of you copies of a 
memorandum and material that we have available to 
us at our court on the death penalty situation insofar 
as it relates to appointment of counsel and successive 
post-conviction relief problems within our state 
court. I hope that you find this of assistance. 
We are continuing to work on the inordinate delays 
in capital cases and when we come to any definitive 
answer I will give you further information. 
In any event, we feel we can do nothing more 
than improve our state situation as much as possible 
and that improvement in the federal habeas corpus 
area is the prerogative of the federal courts. 
I am looking forward to receiving the most 
recent draft of any propos~d legislation that deals 
with the resolution of intercircuit conflicts and/or 
increasing the final decisionmaking capacity of the 
federal appellate system. 
Best wishes to you both. 
S i n c e re 1 Y~, 
Keith M. Callow 
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MEMORANDUM 
VERNON R. PEARSON, Chief Justice 
GEOFFREY CROOKS, Commissioner~ 
Procedures in Death Penalty CasW 
Si.th Floor HIQll••r•-t.ic:enMI 11.,;tdinQ 
12111 aftCI WHhinglon Str-
Ma~ Stop AV• 11 
Oty"'l)ia. WA ~-051 t 
As you know, I recently attended a "Death Penalty 
Resource Planning Conference" sponsored by the American Bar 
Association Postq9nviction Death Penalty Representation Project. 
The principal focus of the conference concerned methods to iden-
tify and support counsel for persons on death row, particularly 
in those proceedings (both state and federal) that occur after a 
conviction and death sentence have been affirmed on appeal. This 
has become an extremely serrous problem, as you might imagine, 
in states with large death row populations. Though we can be 
thankful that it is not yet a major problem here, we now have 
several cases in the postappeal stages, including some that have 
reached or are about to reach federal postconviction proceedings. 
Thus, this is probably the time (before there is some crisis 
requiring immediate attention) to think through more fully the 
postconviction phase in death penalty cases. 
As a ~tarting point, no matter what one's views may be _ 
on the death penalty in general or in a particular case, it seems 
necessary to accept two notions. First, a person condemned to 
death will receive at least one round of postconviction review by 
means of a personal restraint petition in this court followed by 
a habeas corpus petition in federal court. Second, the defendant 
should have counsel at least through this process, and probably 
should have counsel right up to the time of execution. At the 
moment, unfortunately, our personal restraint petition rules 
don't take account of these features of death penalty_cases. Our 
method of insuring that the defendants have counsel during the 
postconviction process could be described all too accurately as 
the "who will Tim Ford find this time" approach. We also, I'm 
afraid, have very little sense of what happens to these cases 
when they get to £:ederal court; there may well be something we 
could be doing, in light of the inevitable federal petitions, to 
~3 
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help the entire process to a conclusion in a manner which is 
orderly, without undue delay, yet properly careful of the defen-
dant's rights. 
We have recently seen or are about to see examples of 
the difficult situations that can arise. In Mitchell Rupe' s 
case, for instance, the Supreme Court has just denied his peti-
tion for certiorari from this court's dec i sion affirming his 
sentence on direct appeal. This is a point in the process where 
it may be necessary or appropriate (as will frequently be true) 
that new counsel take over the defendant's representation. 
Ideally new counsel would take the case intending to carry it 
through both a personal restraint petition and federal · habeas. 
The processes for appointment and compensation of counsel are 
separate in the two courts, though. Moreover, the personal 
restraint petition rules do not contemplate appointment of coun-
sel until after a petition has been filed, which obviously does 
not work in death penalty cases. What we have had to do in most 
of the p e rsonal restraint petitions we have seen (Mak, Jeffries, 
and Harris, for example) is to open a prospective prp file, 
appoint counsel, and grant a stay of execution to enable counsel 
to actually prepare a petition. This has worked to this point, 
but probably only because in sever al cases Tim Ford has taken a 
lead role in finding counsel willing to accept appointment, and 
because the prosecutors' offices have been understanding and 
cooperative. Even so, the Clerk's Office has found itself in the 
rather problematic position of negotiating with prospective 
counsel at the outset on such-matters as due dates and compensa-
tion. 
The procedure for stays of execution also presents a 
number of problems which neither the prp rules nor the statutes 
seem to address in a way that takes iccount of the practicality 
of the postconviction process. Some of these problems are 
illustrated in the motion for a stay in Mak, which was considered 
by a depa r tment of the court on July 5, 1988. At the moment we 
may simply be tossing these cases, like bombs ' with lighted fuses, 
to the federal court. It is probably worth exploring, however, 
at least for the first round of postconviction proceedings, 
whether there is a more structured way to proceed which would 
save wear and tear on both courts and on counsel, as well as on 
the defendant and the survivors of the victims. A process that 
ran according to rules and procedures designed specifically for 
these cases would not necessarily be any longer than what happens 
already, and' would likely have several advantages over the ad hoc 
procedures these cases follow now. The time and effort of coun-
sel and the courts might not need to be spent on stays of un-
realistic execution dates, for example, and could instead be 
directed to the main task of fully but efficiently litigating all 
of a defendant's possibly meritorious claims. A clearer process 
might also help the media and the public understand how these 
cases work. 
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In a number of other states, various of these ques-
tions, and particularly the problem of making sure indigent death 
row inmates have counsel, have been addressed as a result of 
joint initiatives of the state supreme court and the federal 
district courts. The time may have come for something similar to 
happen here, perhaps starting with appointment of a committee or 
task force with representatives from each court, the State (both 
prosecuting attorneys and the Attorney General), the defense bar, 
and the State Bar. Such a committee might start by devising a 
system for identifying counsel to represent indigent death row 
defendants in· postconviction proceedings, and then might look 
into and make suggestions about the rest of the proce·ss that 
could help make these difficult cases as problem-free as 
possible. 








MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Campbell v. Kincheloe 
None Assigned 
October 6, 1988 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
TYPE OF CASE: Death row inmate requests appointment of counsel 
to assist in filing second collateral relief petition. 
STATEMENT OF CASE: 
.. 
On August 24, 1988, death row inmate Charles Campbell filed 
a handwritten "motion for appointment of counsel on appeal 
seeking collateral review. " The court was informed of this 
pleading shortly before the August 31, 1988 en bane administra-
tive conference. Following that conference, the court requested 
this office to prepare a memorandum addressing several questions 
relating to the status of Campbell's case and his present request 
for counsel. 
Procedural Facts. This court affirmed Campbell's aggravated 
murder convictions and death sentence on November 6, 1984. State 
v. Campbell, 103 Wn. 2d 1, 691 P. 2d 929 (1984). Following the 
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, the trial 
court signed a death warrant ordering Campbell's execution on 
July 25, 1985. From May 17 to - June 25, Campbell was represented 
by Evergreen Legal Services in connection with contemplated post-
conviction relief proceedings. Before any pleadings were filed, 
however, Evergreen lost its funding to represent Walla Walla 
inmates. 
On June 25, 1985, Chief Justice Dolliver appointed attorney 
Raymond Thoenig (then with the Washington Appellate Defender 
Association) to represent Campbell in connection with a planned 
personal restraint petition. On July 11, Thoenig and his co-
counsel, James Lobsenz, filed a motion to stay Campbell's execu-
tion. Counsel said they could complete their review of the 
record and file a personal restraint petition by August 30, 1985. 
The motion for stay listed 23 issues counsel had thus far 
identified and included argument on some of them. The court also 
received prose pleadings from Campbell . himself. 
On July 18, 1985, this court entered an order denying the 
motion for stay. The order also says the court treated the 
motion and Campbell's pro se pleadings as personal restraint 
petitions, which the court denied on the merits. 
Attorneys Lobsenz' and Thoenig then filed a federal habeas 
corpus petition and motion for stay of Campbell's execution. The 
-1-
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federal court stayed the execution a few days before it was to be 
carried out. Later, however, because the petition raised both 
exhausted and unexhausted claims, the court, as required by RQll 
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982), 
dismissed the case and required Campbell to either refile an 
amended petition raising only the exhausted claims or file 
pleadings in state court raising the new issues. Counsel elected 
not to raise the new issues in state court, but to file an 
amended federal habeas corpus petition raising only those issues 
the District Court had indicated were properly presented. 
Following an evidentiary hearing on one of Campbell's ~laims 
(challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel), the 
District Court denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit has since 
affirmed the District Court's decision and denied a motion for en 
bane reconsideration. Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F. 2d 1453 (9th 
Cir. 1987). Campbell's pro se petition for certiorari is pending 
in the Supreme Court. In all likelihood that petition will be 
denied shortly after the court begins its fall term. 
Legal Claims Thus Far Presented. On appeal, Campbell 
argued that: (1) the trial court violated his right to a speedy 
trial; (2) the prosecutor acted improperly by referring to an 
attempted rape not later proved; (3) failure to disclose certain 
exculpatory evidence prior to trial was not adequately corrected 
by instructions to the jury; (4) two witnesses should have been 
precluded from testifying because police notes of their pretrial 
statements were destroyed; (5) the trial court denied Campbell's 
right of confrontation by limiting his cross examination of Jerry 
Ethington (a fellow work release inmate); (6) the trial court 
erroneously admitted evidence seized from Campbell when he was 
taken into custody; ( 7) a search of Campbell's car was uncon-
stitutional; (8) the trial court erroneously admitted a glass 
containing Campbell's fingerprint; (9) the death penalty statute 
is unconstitutional, on various theories, because it gives the 
prosecutor discretion in charging; (10) the death penalty statute 
provides insufficient standards to guide jury discretion; (11) 
the death sentence in this case cannot withstand the statutory 
review required under RCW 10. 95. 130(2); and (12) the death 
penalty constitutes cruel punishment, in violation of Const. art. 
1, § 14. State v. Campbell, supra. at 4-5. 
In the motion for stay of execution, counsel said they had, 
upon "partial review of the record," identified 23 •meritorious 
issues." Motion, at 8. These are, using counsel's numbering: 
( 1) admission of Campbell' s 1976 b..trglary conviction in the 
penalty phase violated his constitutional rights because the plea 




(2) the prosecutor improperly referred to "societal self 
defense" in closing argument; 
(3) the prosecutor also improperly told the jurors they 
were not supposed to consider the appropriateness 9f the death 
penalty; 
( 4) trial counsel's failure to present any evidence in the 
penalty phase constituted ineffective assistance; 
(5) the prosecutor failed to aver in the death penalty 
notice that he had II reason to believe" there were insufficient 
mi ti gating circumstances to merit leniency; 
( 6) the trial court denied Campbell' s right to compulsory 
process by declining to order Jerold Ethington to furnish a hair 
sample to compare with those found on the victims; 
( 7) the same error also violated cantpbell' s Eighth 
Amendment right to present evidence in mitigation of punishment; 
(8) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of 
cantpbell' s attempted rape of a prosecution witness; 
( 9) Campbell' s appellate counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to raise i ssues (1)-(8) above; 
(10) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jurors 
to agree unanirrously as to which crime cantpbell intended to conunit 
when he entered the victims' home; 
(11) the trial court should have instructed the jurors in 
the penalty phase to consider and be influenced by sympathy for the 
defendant; 
( 12) the court should also have cautioned the jurors not to 
illlfX)Se the death penalty in a spirit of vengeance or retribution; 
(13) the jurors should have been cautioned again in the 
penalty phase not to consider the defendant's failure to testify; 
( 14) the court erroneously told the jurors they could con-
sider in the penalty phase all evidence which had been presented in 
the guilt phase; 
(15) a deferrlant in a capital case must be irrlicted by a 
grand jury; 
(16) the penalty phase instructions and RCW 10. 95. 060(4) 
improperly require the deferrlant to prove why leniency should be 
granted; 
( 17) the prosecutor' s clcsing argument also improperly 
shifted the burden of proof in the penalty phase; 
( 18) sul:mi.ssion of the report required by RCW 10. 95. 120 
violates the defendant' s constitutional r;i.ghts; 
(19) the trial court improperly excused outright prospective 
jurors who expressed religious scruples against the death penalty, 
instead of allowing them to sit only on the guilt phase of trial; 
(20) death qualifying a jury results in a conviction-prone 
panel; 
(21) the same process denies the deferxlant his constitu-
tional right to a n-i;al by jury; · 
(22) the death penalty statute creates an unconstitutional, 
nrurlatory, death penalty; and 
-3-
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(23) the jury made special findings on two aggravating 
factors that overlap and thus violate Double Jeopardy principles. 
Campbell's initial federal court pleading raised, by the 
federal court's count, some 61 issues. Actually, the petition 
does not seem to raise that many i ssues. The difficulty is that 
the petition f i rst lists 32 issues (labeled with letters) and 
then discusses approximately 26 issues (labeled with numbers). 
Some of the issues discussed are not listed, some in the list are 
not later discussed, and the discussed issues are not in the same 
order as the l ist. 
In any event, the federal court ultimately addressed-and 
rejected--Campbell's claims regarding (1) grand jury indictment; 
(2) the prosecutor's closing argument (four separate issues); (3) 
loss or destruction of police notes; (4) Jerold Ethington; (5) 
delayed disclosure of certain exculpatory evidence; (6) admission 
of the fingerprinted glass; (7) validity of prior burglary 
conv iction; (8) trial counsel's failure to present any evidence 
in mitigation of punishment; (9) ineffective assistance of 
counsel on appeal; (10) the trial judge's sentencing report; (11) 
prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty; ( 12) facial 
validity of the death penalty statute; ( 13) burden of proof in 
the p~nalty phase; (14) mandatory death penalty; and (15) double 
jeopardy. 
The issues listed or discussed in the original federal 
pleading, but found to be unexhausted, include claims that: (a) 
Campbell was "absent" during several critical hearings, including 
the entire period between the date he was sent for a competency 
evaluation and the date he was found to be competent; (b) he did 
not validly waive his right to be present during jury selection; 
(c) the competency interview was conducted in violation of 
Campbell's right to counsel; (d) trial counsel was ineffective 
because he favored the death penalty and felt death was an 
appropriate penalty for killing a child; and (e) Campbell was 
denied effective representation in the state post-conviction 
proceedings. 
Campbell's present motion does not say whether he now 
wishes to raise these issues; they are s .imply the main claims his 
previous attorneys identified that have not yet been exhausted. 
Counsel, if now appointed, would presumably consider these issues 
but might also identify additional, entirely different issues. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE REQUEST FOR COUNSEL: 
(1) Does Campbel~ have a constitutional right to appointed 




(2) If not, should court nevertheless exercise its discre-
tionary authority to appoint counsel under RAP 16. 15(g)? 
(3) What effect do this court's rulings on the 1985 motion 
for stay and the present motion for appointment of counsel have 
on Campbell's ability to raise his as yet unexhausted claims in 
federal court? 
ANALYSIS: 
(1) Right to Counsel. Two lines of Supreme Court decisions 
touch upon whether Campbell has a federal constitutional ri~ht to 
counsel at this stage of the proceedings. The first line is 
represented by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 100 L. Ed. 891, 
76 s. Ct. 585 (1956) and Douglas v. California. 372 u. S. 353, 9 
L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963), both of which dealt with 
equal protection challenges to financial requirements imposed on 
indigent criminal defendants. In Griffin, the court struck down, 
on equal protection grounds, a state rule which conditioned the 
right to appeal on the defendant's ability to obtain a trial 
transcript. In Douglas, the Court found an Equal Protection 
Clause-based right to appointed counsel on appeal. 
rhe second line of cases involves the right of access to the 
courts, and is represented by Bounds v. Smith, 4 30 U. S. 81 7, 52 
L. Ed. 2d 72, 97 s. Ct. 1491 (1977) and Johnson y. Avery, 393 
U. S. 483, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718, 89 · S. Ct. 747 (1969). In Avery. the 
Court held that a prison rule which prohibited inmates from 
acting as "writ writers" for each other infringed upon the 
inmates' right of access to the courts. In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court noted the State's failure to "provide an 
available alternative to the assistance provided by other 
inmates." Johnson y. Avery, supra, at 488. In Bounds. the Court 
discussed the possible "alternatives" and held that "law librar-
ies or other forms of legal assistance are needed to give prison-
ers a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed viola-
tions of fundamental constitutional rights" in post-conviction 
pleadings. Bounds v, Smith, supra, at 825. 
In Ross Y, Moffitt. 417 U.S. 600, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 94 s. 
Ct. 2347 (1974), the Supreme Court dis.cussed both equal protec-
tion and "meaningful access" concerns in connection with prison-
ers seeking appointed counsel to assist them in filing discre-
tionary state appeals (beyond the first appeal of right) and 
applications for review by the Supreme Court. The court found 
no such right to counsel under either theory. ~, at 612 (equal 
protection), 614-15 ("meaningful access"). Relying on Moffitt, 
the court in Pennsylvania y. Finley. u. s. , 95 L. Ed. 2d 
539, 545. 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987). found no right to appointed 
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. As in Moffitt, 
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and rejected both equal 
concerns. Finley, 95 L. 
the court addressed 
"meaningful access" 
(equal protection), 547 (meaningful access). 
protection 
Ed. 2_d, at 
and 
546 
A divided Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, recently distin-
guished Finley and Moffitt and relied instead on Bounds to 
concl ude that death row inmates do have a right to appointed 
counsel to assist them in pursuing post-conviction claims. 
Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F. 2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988). Of Finley, 
the ma j ority said only: 
Finley was not a meaningful access case, nor did it address the 
rule enunciated in Bounc!s v. Smith. lwbst significantly, Finley 
did not involve the death penalty. 
Giarratano v. Murray. supra, at 1120. As noted above, the first 
of these statements is simply inaccurate. Regardless of whether 
the Finley court cited Bounds. the court clearly did discuss the 
"meaningful access" doctrine and expressly rejected the prison-
er's claim that "the equal protection guarantee of 'meaningful 
access' was violated in this case." Pennsylvania v. Finley. 
supra, 95 L. Ed. 2d, at 547. 
~oreover, Bounds does not necessarily require appointment of 
counsel to ensure "meaningful access" to the courts. The Supreme 
Court held only that prisoners must be provided with II adequate 
law libraries~ adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law. " (Emphasis added. ) Bounds y. Smith, supra. at 828. The 
State therefore may fully discharge its obligation under Bounds 
by providing prisoners with access to an adequate law library. 
M.., at 830 (this is one "constitutionally acceptable method to 
assure meaningful access"). If no such library is available, the 
State's other option of providing access to "persons trained in 
the law" may be satisfied through the use of "paraprofessionals 
and law students" or even inmates trained as "paralegal assis-
tants." Id. 
Thus, despite the Fourth Circuit's holding in Giarratano, 
although states must provide inmates with some type of assistance 
in preparing habeas corpus petitions and similar pleadings, 
Bounds, at 828, the right of meaningful access to the courts 
does not include the right to appointed counsel beyond the first 
appeal of right. Finley. 95 L. Ed. 2d at 547. 
The Giarranto majority's second point is at least factually 
correct-neither Finley nor Moffitt (nor Bounds, for that matter) 
was a capital case. It is unclear, however, whether this factor 
is significant to the, right to counsel issue. In the Sixth 
Amendment context, the Supreme Court has expressly declined to 
recognize any greater right to trial counsel in capital than in 
-6-
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noncapital cases. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. s. 668, 80 L. 
Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct . 2052 (1984). Similarly, in adopting 
procedures to govern motions for stays pending appeal in habeas 
corpus actions, the court has s i mply treated an impe nding execu-
tion as one II proper considera t ion" to weigh in the balance. 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 u. s. 880, 893, 77 L. Ed. 2d. 1090, 103 
S. Ct. 3383 (1983). The "severity of the sentence" does not 
"itself suffice to warrant" a stay. Id.; ~ ~ Smith v. 
Murrav, 477 u. s. 527, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434, 106 s. Ct. 2661 (1986) 
(procedural default rules for federal habeas petitioners are the 
same in capital and noncapital cases) . 
Al though Strickland and Barefoot do not involve the right 
of access to the courts or the Equal Protection Clause-based 
right to counsel, they do at least suggest that the Supreme Court 
would not view the capital nature of the case as disposi ti ve. 
Several courts have reached this conclusion and found no federal 
constitutional right to counsel in habeas corpus actions, even 
where the death penalty has been imposed. ~ Whitley v. Muncy. 
823 F. 2d 55, 56 (4th Cir. 1987) (panel opinion decided prior to 
en bane decision in Giarratano); Gray v. Lucas. 710 F. 2d 1048, 
1061 (5th Cir. 1983); Thomas v. State, 511 So. 2d 248 . (Ala. Cr. 
App . 1987); State v. Davis, 246 Ga. 200, 269 s . E. 2d 461, cert. 
denied, 449 U. S. 1057 (1980). 
This court has not addressed this issue since Finley. In a 
noncapital case decided prior to Finley, this court held that 
an indigent state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief is 
entitled, under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amerrlment to the United states Cons ti tutio~ to be furnished 
appointed counsel, \.IlX)n request, to assist him in prosecuting his 
petition at the evidentiary hearing stage and/or at the first 
appellate level when (1) his petition is urged in good faith; (2) 
his petition raises significant issues which, when considered in 
the light of the state' s responsive pleadings or the evidence 
adduced at an evidentiary hearing, are neither fri. volous nor 
repetitive; and ( 3) such issues by their nature and character 
indicate the necessity for professional legal assistance if they 
are to be presented and considered in a fair and meaningful manner. 
Honore y. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. 77 wn. 2d 660, 673, 
466 P. 2d 485 (1970). Since this holding is premised solely on 
the federal constitution, it is no longer valid in light of 
Finley. 
The question thus becomes whether the state constitution 
provides a theoretical ,basis for adhering to the rule in Honore. 
The holding in that case rests on the Equal Protection Clause of 




classifications, State v . Wood. 89 Wn. 2d 97, 100, 569 P. 2d 1148 
( 1977), this court has found "no compelling reason" to interpret 
the parallel state provis i on, Const. art. 1, § 12, · so as to 
provide greater protections than the federal Equal Protection 
Clause. Electrical Contractors v. Pierce Cy., 100 Wn. 2d 109, 
126, 667 P. 2d 1092 (1983); ~ .a1.fil2_ Conklin v. Shinpoch, 107 
Wn. 2d 410, 416 n. 2 , 730 P. 2d 643 (1986) ("Our interpretations of 
[art. 1, § 12) have followed the interpretation of the equal 
protection clause of the federal Fourteenth Amendment. ") Most 
pertinent to the presen t case, this court has followed federal 
precedent in addressi ng challenges to wealth-based classifica-
tions. ~ State v . Phelan, 100 Wn. 2d 508, 513-14, 671 P. 2d 1212 
( 1983). The cases interpreting article 1, section 12 thus do 
n ot provide an independent state constitutional basis for 
rejecting the equal protection holding in Finley. 
Nor does the state constitutional provision regarding the 
writ of habeas corpus appear to be of assistance here. Article 
1, section 13 is almost identical to the parallel federal provis-
ion. Compare Const. art. 1, § 13 ("The privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended . . . . 11 ) with U. S. Const. 
art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (to this extent identical). . 
Outside the habeas corpus area, this court has found a right 
to appointed counsel even though the Supreme Court has declined 
to do so. Compare In re Hall, 99 Wn. 2d 842, 846, 664 P. 2d 1245 
(1983) (recognizing right to · counsel in parental termination 
cases) and In re Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975) 
(right applies even in dependency proceedings which may later 
lead to termination) with Lassiter y. Department of Social 
Services, 452 u. s. 18, 31, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 101 s. ct. 2153 
(1981) (generally no such federal right even in termination cases 
unless parents are incompetent). These dependency cases do not 
contain any independent state constitutional analysis, however. 
Myricks is based on a due process analysis the Supreme Court 
later found unpersuasive in Lassiter (In re Myricks, supra, at 
254), and ~ may rest on RCW 13. 34. 090, which creates a 
statutory right to counsel in such cases. ~ In re Hall, supra, 
at 846 (right to counsel "finds its basis solely on state law"). 
There is no similar statutory right to appointed counsel in 
habeas corpus actions (ch. 7. 36 RCW) or in personal restraint 
proceedings ( RAP 16. 4, et seq). In personal restraint proceed-
ings, the appellate court "may" appoint counsel, RAP 16. 15{g), 
but is not required to do so. {This rule is discussed in more 
detail in issue (2) below.) RCW 7. 36. 250 provides for prosecu-
tion of habeas corpus actions in forma pauperis, but does not 
mention counsel. ~ Honore v, Board of Prison Terms and 
Paroles, supra, at 674-77 {relying on the statute only as author-
-8-
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i ty for appointment and payment of attorneys constitutionally 
required to be appointed). 
To summarize to this point, there is no federal constitu-
tional right to counsel past the first appeal of right, 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra, and state law also does not seem 
to create or recognize such a right. Inmates do, however, have a 
constitutional right of access to the courts, which may be 
addressed by providing access to law libraries or to lay or 
professional legal assistance. Bounds v. Smith, supra. The 
best means of complying with Bounds is discussed below, in issue 
( 2). 
( 2) RAP 16. 15 ( g). This court has discretion under RAP 
16. 15(g) to appoint counsel for any indigent personal restraint 
petitioner. For the reasons discussed below, exercise of this 
authority is probably the most practical means of guaranteeing 
all death row inmates their right of access to the courts. 
It seems apparent from other personal restraint petitions 
concerning death row inmates that their access to law libraries, 
law books, and other inmates is extremely limited. Under Bounds, 
this court could theoretically address the right of access to the 
courts by requiring prison officials to provide these inmates 
with ·"adequate access" to law books or to fellow inmate "writ 
writers." The latter requirement likely would interfere 
significantly with prison safety concerns, however, and the 
quality of pleadings submitted either by "writ writers" or by 
death row inmates with access to law books undoubtedly would be 
of little value to the inmates or the courts. The most practical 
and efficient means of complying with Bounds, then, would seem to 
be to provide counsel for death row inmates seeking to file 
habeas corpus or personal restraint petitions challenging their 
convictions or sentences. 
Although appointing counsel may involve expense and some 
initial delay, it would serve two important functions. First, 
inmates' personal restraint petitions could be decided on the 
merits instead of being effectively dismissed by a ruling declin-
ing to appoint counsel. Once an issue has been decided on its 
merits, it generally cannot be renew~d in state court, In re 
Haverty, 101 Wn. 2d 498, 681 P. 2d 835 (1984), and the inmate can 
raise the issue in federal court without facing procedural 
difficulties. (~ discussion in issue (3).) Second, an inmate 
who files a personal restraint petition with the assistance of 
counsel may later fairly be subject to procedural rules, such as 
scrutiny of successive petitions for waiver or abuse of the 
writ, which would be more difficult to apply to an unrepresented 
inmate. ~ In re Haverty, supra, at 503 (successive petition 
may be dismissed "'if there has been an abuse of the writ'") 
-9-
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(quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17, 10 L. Ed. 2d 
148, 83 s. Ct. 1068 (1963) ); Antone v. Dugger, 465 u. s. 200, 206 
n. 4, 79 L. Ed. 2d 147, 104 s. Ct. 962 (1984); Woodard v. 
Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 379 n. 3, 78 L. Ed. 2d 541,- 104 S. Ct. 
752 ( 1984) (both noting presence of counsel in prior action as 
pertinent factor in finding abuse of writ); Jones v. Estelle, 722 
F. 2d 159 (5th Cir. 1983) (habeas petitioner is bound by knowledge 
chargeable to his competent habeas attorney). Appointing counsel 
thus may actually serve to promote finality in capital cases. 
To the extent that the appointment of counsel may be seen as 
causing unnecessary delays, that problem can be addressed in 
other ways. Rules approved recently by a California federal 
district court task force offer one example. Under these 
proposed rules, the District Court would automatically appoint 
counsel for all capital defendants in habeas corpus actions 
(unless counsel is waived) and would grant a 45-day stay of 
execution to enable counsel to identify and specify nonfrivolous 
issues. Once counsel has identified such issues, the court would 
grant a 120-day stay to allow counsel to prepare and file a 
proper habeas corpus petition. If counsel is unable to identify 
any nonfrivolous issues, however, the initial 45-day stay would 
be .dissolved. 
An approach like this, at least for initial post-conviction 
proceedings, has several qualities to recommend it. First, the 
court does not have to examine the merits of the case in a 
hurried or incomplete fashion simply in order to rule on a 
request for counsel. Second, counsel can be required to identify 
nonfri volous legal issues within a relatively short period of 
time. Third, if no such issues exist, the case can be dismissed 
on its merits, rather than by denying a motion for counsel. 
Fourth, if there are nonfrivolous issues, the court can decide 
them after full consideration, with adequate and presumably 
competent briefing. Finally, formal adoption of such a procedure 
would give notice both to defendants and to counsel as to the 
manner in which capital cases will be treated. Assuming counsel 
are aware of the "abuse of the writ" aspect of Haverty. they 
should also be aware that failure to raise all nonfrivolous 
issues in a first petition could lead to dismissal of any 
subsequent petition. Counsel should therefore be motivated to 
examine the record carefully during the initial stay and to raise 
all identifiable issues in the first petition. 
In sum, all death row inmates have a constitutional right of 
access to the courts. Although there are several means by which 
this right can be guaranteed, several practical considerations 
support adoption of a, consistent approach such as the one the 
California task force has approved. Under that approach, 






issues he wishes to raise in his personal restraint petition. 
This is true even though Campbell was previously before this 
court seeking post-conviction relief, given the truncated nature 
of that prior proceeding, as is noted again below. 
( 3) Effe ct on Federal Proceedings. Finally, the court has 
inquired as to the effects of its various rulings in Campbell's 
c ase on his future efforts at s e eking relief in federal court. 
This is difficult to explain or predict confidently, as this 
court has received no briefing on these points. Nonetheless, a 
plausible analysis follows: 
This court's 1985 ruling, treating Campbell's motion for a 
stay as a personal restraint petition, was made before Campbell's 
attorneys fully reviewed the record or raised all of the issues 
they later identified. The dismissal was on the merits of the 23 
i dentified issues, however, and was treated as such by the 
federal court. Those issues thus have been finally disposed of 
in state court and, to the extent Campbell renewed them in his 
federal court pleadings, in that court as well. 
The first effect of the 1985 ruling was to force counsel to 
go to federal court to obtain a stay of execution. Since counsel 
had nqt at that time completed their review of the record, they 
were also required to make certain decisions as to any newly 
identified claims. Under a 1982 Supreme Court decision, a 
petitioner cannot raise both exhausted and unexhausted claims in 
a federal habeas corpus action. Rose v. Lundy. 455 U. S. 509, 
71 L. Ed. 2d 3 79, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982). Counsel thus had to 
choose between raising only the 23 exhausted claims in a federal 
petition or returning to state court to raise the newly iden-
tified claims. By electing to file an amended federal petition 
raising only the exhausted claims, counsel "risk forfeiting 
consideration of his unexhausted claims in federal court" in any 
subsequent petition. Rose y. Lundy. supra. at 520. (plurality 
opinion on this issue). 
Apparently, forfeiture will occur under this rule unless 
there has been some intervening development in the law or a 
discovery of new evidence. Jones y. Estelle, 722 F. 2d 159, 169 
( 5th Cir. 1983). If neither of these _factors is present here, 
the federal court may decline to consider any of the unexhausted 
i ssues Campbell identified in his first federal habeas petition, 
Rose y. Lundy. supra, or indeed, any other claim of which his 
attorneys were aware or should have been aware when they filed 
the first petition. Sanders v, United States, supra; Moore y. 
Zfillt, 734 F. 2d 585 (11th Cir. 1984). 
, 
Counsel may argue that it would have been futile to raise 







the motion for stay. If the federal court had found state 
remedies to be unavailable or inadequate, however, Campbell would 
not have been barred from raising his unexhausted claims in the 
initial federal petition. 28 U.S. C. 2254(b) (exhaustion not 
required if state remedies are ineffective or unavailable). 
Habeas courts are reticent to hold that state courts will refuse 
to consider an issue unless the state court's position is quite 
clear. ~, ~, Thomas v. Wyrick, 622 F. 2d 411 ( 8th Cir. 
1980); Twitty v. Smith, 614 F. 2d 325 (2d Cir. 1979). Although 
this court did deny Campbell's motion for stay of execution, the 
court also took that occasion to rule on the merits of the 
issues he had thus far identified. Perhaps the federal · court 
felt this court would have been equally willing to rule on any 
additional claims Campbell would have brought to the court's 
attention. 
In any event, the combined effect of 
ruling and counsels' subsequent decisions is 
tionable whether a federal court would rule on 
new claims Campbell may ident ify. 
the court's 1985 
to make it ques -
the merits of any 
If the federal court declines to penalize Campbell for his 
attorney's 1985 decisions, he still cannot raise new issues in 
federal court unless he exhausts the available state remedies or 
is excused from doing so. 28 U.S. C. 2254(b) and (c). Moreover, 
in order to exhaust state remedies as to a particular issue, the 
prisoner must clearly identify the issue to the state court. ~ 
Pitchess Y, Davis, 421 u. s. 482, 44 L. Ed. 2d 317, 95 s. Ct. 1748 
(1975). Exhaustion is excused "only if there is no opportunity 
to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is 
clearly so deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain 
relief." Duckworth y, Serrano, 454 u. s. 1, 3, 70 L. Ed. 2d 1, 
102 S. Ct. 1 (1981). If denying Campbell's motion for counsel 
effectively prevents him from identifying any new issues in state 
court, federal court litigation on the exhaustion issue and the 
"deficiency" of state remedies seems inevitable. ~ Ex parte 
Davis. 318 u. s. 412, 87 L. Ed. 868, 63 s. Ct. 679 (1943) (state 
court's refusal to obtain transcript for indigent petitioner may 
render state remedy ineffective). 
RECOMMENDATION: 
The need to provide some type of legal assistance for 
capital defendants in personal restraint proceedings presents 
difficult questions which the court should study and which should 
ultimately be addressed by some established procedure. In this 
particular case, Campbell should be appointed counsel, who should 
be given a fixed period of time to identify nonfrivolous, non-
repetitive issues. The order should also (1) preclude the trial 
court from setting an execution date in the interim, and ( 2) 
-12-
• 
.. • .. 
Ca mpbell Page -13-
specify that this court will review the case once the issues have 
been identified and d etermine whether the stay should be extended 







JUSTICE LEW I S F. POWELL, JR. 
RETIRED 
.jnitrtmt Qlltltrl of tltt ~b jltatt• 
,ru~ J. C!f. 2llffe'!, 
October 30, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
MEMO TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS: 
You have a copy of the Congressional Record that 
contains the Biden bill (see Bill Burchill's letter of Octo-
ber 17). I now send you by express mail Hew Pate's memoran-
dum of October 30 in which he analyzes the Biden proposal in 
some detail. 
As I have been out of my office since Thursday, I 
have not had an opportunity to review Hew's memo carefully. 
On the basis of a first reading, I am inclined to agree with 
Hew that the states and the courts would be better off with 
the status quo than under what Senator Biden proposes. 
The Biden provisions with respect to the qualifica-
tions of counsel in many cases would be impossible to meet. 
I doubt that any member of the Supreme Court, except Justice 
Marshall, possesses the qualifications Biden proposes for 
counsel representing a capital defendant on state collateral 
review. As I read his proposal, such counsel, in addition 
to having been admitted to practice for "at least five 
years", must have had "at least three years experience in 
felony appeals". I would fall far short of meeting these 
standards, as would a high percentage of the bar. The pro-
vision for unlimited funding could also be a major objection 
for the states. 
I am - in some doubt as to my testimony on November 
8. I have thought it would be appropriate for me, on behalf 
of our Committee, to make a summary statement. Of course, 
there will be questions. A longe_r written statement could -
be filed. I may well be asked my view of the Biden bill, 
and I suppose I should respond as briefly as I can. 
Normally a Supreme Court Justice does not testify at 
all, much less about pending legislation. I therefore am 
not happy about my present situatibn. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chief 




cc: The Chief Justice 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire 








October 30, 1989 
Senator Biden's Habeas Proposal 
Introduction 
Senator Biden has recently introduced legislation, Bill 
s. 1757, that purports to be based on your proposed statute 
(S. 1760, introduced by Senator Thurmond) with "minor" al-
terations. These alterations are major, and passage of no 
legislation at all would be preferable to passage of the 
Biden Bill. I thi~k that it is vital you make this clear in 
your testimony. Your proposal is based on a "quid pro quo." 
The Biden Bill appears aimed at making the "quid pro quo" so 
unfavorable to the States that they will have no incentive 
to opt for the new statute. The Biden Bill has the effect 
of removing any chance of finality, doubling the limitations 
period, and overruling ·supreme Court cases on procedural 
default and retroactivity. · A point by point discussion fol-
lows. 
1. Qualifications and Payment of Counsel 
Your proposal requires States that would opt in to pro-
vide qualified counsel in state collateral proceedings. It~ 
would leave to the States the initial responsibility to set 
standards of competence and compensation. Powell §2256. 
- 2 -
The Bi den Bi 11 expands these provisions, setting specific 
standards for appointment and unlimited compensation. 
a. Standards for Appointment 
Unlike your proposal, which would allow the States to 
devise standards and procedures for the appointment of coun-
sel, the Biden Bill sets forth a uniform federal standard 
that the States must meet. Post-conviction lawyers must 
have been admitted to practice in the state court of last 
resort for at least five years, and have at least three 
years experience in felony appeals. The statute allows for 
appointment of an attorney who does not meet these qualifi-
cations if the attorney has special "background, knowledge, 
or experience." 
b. Trial Counsel 
The Biden Bill would also require states to provide 
counsel who meet specified criteria for trial in all capital 
cases. The trial attorney must have been admitted to prac-
tice in the trial court for at least five years, and have at 
least three ye~rs experience in trying felonies. The stat-
ut~ all?ws_ for _ appointment of a~ atto_rney who doe.s not meet 
these qualifications if the attorney has special "back~ 
ground, knowledge, or experience." 
c. Level of Compensation 
The Biden Bill also includes a provision for compensa-
~ 
tion, but it does not set a schedule of fee rates~ Rather, 
it commands that "Notwithstanding the rates and maximum lim-
its generally applicable to criminal cases and any other 
:•.• •- A.~.i.~"• )• • •_~:.~:;•·~• ~•. :_;;:d.!::~-:•-•~.=;(t!-•~ •--~6-:-..;;.•:~~~,: }~(:":ff:;.f:;~t:-~~~I )- • ,;;;-,. •- .. •-. •· ..;. 
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provision of law to the contrary," the court shall set fees 
and expenses at whatever level is necessary to "carry out 
the requirements of the subsection." Biden S2261. This 
section leaves the amount of compensation to the discretion 
of the appointing judge. Importantly, it preempts all state 
law limits on the amount of fees, leaving the size of the 
potential fee award subject to no limit whatever. 
d. Investigative and Expert Services 
The Biden Bill requires that expert and investigative 
services be provided to the defendant upon a finding in an 
ex parte hearing that such services would be reasonably nee-
essary. As with . compensation of counsel, the Biden Bill 
places no limits on the amount that a state may be required 
· to spend for these services, as long as a court finds them 
to be reasonably necessary. Biden S2261(c). 
Analysis: Senator Biden may have admirable goals, but 
~:-;;=~,:~i:• .t .~·~,.-·, ... <_~;: 
the attempt to impose such expensive requirements of counsel 
on the States may make the statute unattractive to them. If 
the States see the stat_ute as too .expensive, they will not . 
use it and it will accomplish nothing. The idea of stand-
ards for __ the appointment of counsel may in fact -·be a goo~ 
· one. But as Judge Claik argued, there is a great federalism 
value in allowing the States to take the first crack at de-
veloping standards. In sum, the standards for appointment 
are an area where you might express som~ qualified support 
for the Biden proposal despite the fact that the Committee 
reached a different conclusion. The requirement for counsel 
:.:~_.: . ~.:~;::~~~ ~~~~:1i~~~;1I:-~~2~~m~~~;~~~'.:-~~~15;f ~~;~!:rili.~~ ,;_-: :.~~. i. ~ i:~i{i!~~0 ·t·~J. -h: ·~ 0 .i~:~•i~I1i; :Z~~~-~!~::;~~Jf~~-~~;,~ .: ~:i·~~~\ 
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at trial is another area where you might express approval of 
Biden's goal of improving the quality of counsel. But 
changing the state law governing appointment of counsel at 
trial is highly intrusive. This is an area where the Biden 
Bill may be so unattractive to the States that they will not 
opt in. 
The Biden Bill's funding provisions are the biggest 
problem in this section. They make the amount that States 
must pay for defense counsel unlimited. Most States now 
place strict limits on the amount that may be spent by ap-
pointed criminal defense counsel, and the Biden Bill's fund-
ing provision may entail a huge expense for the States. The 
investigative and 
this high expense. 
expert services provision only adds to 
Moreover, the Bi-den Bill sets absolutely 
no standards for the amount of compensation -- it will vary 
from case to case depending solely on the discretion of the 
trial judge. The provision thus ensures that defendants 
will not be treated equally. I think that you should 
strongly oppose this funding proyision. It will make, the 
proposed statute a dead letter. 
2. Waiver of Counsel 
Your proposal provides that the appointing court must 
make findings of competency and knowing waiver where the 
defendant declines an offer of counsel. Powell S2256(c). 
The Biden Bill expands on this7 requiring that the appoint-
ing court conduct a hearing. More important, the Biden Bill 
requires immediate review of the decision allowing waiver of 
~::._~.~-- -~ ~.:r;;t0°·: -~\'. -· -~~~~~_..:~: -~L . ,, , --:....~~r~1-2{._-~ :::~i-~-~  ~~- ,, ·:-~ · (-.5;;-~s~:··<f.7 ... ~~ ,: :-:.~,~-·: :~ 1~ : ~ 
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counsel by the State's court of last resort. 
S2256(c). 
Biden 
Analysis: This provision clarifies the procedure to be 
followed in determining competence to waive counsel. But it 
imposes an additional layer of appellate review, and there-
fore more delay. Moreover, this federal statute would dis-
place state law governing appellate review of the competency 
decision. Although this provision seems unnecessarily in-
trusive on the States, I do not recommend you spend much 
energy criticizing it. There are more important problems 
with the Biden Bill that should receive top priority. 
3. Successive Petitions -- "Miscarriage of Justice" 
Your proposal would allow subsequent petitions1 for 
claims that could not have..... been raised due to unconsti tu-
tional state action, new retroactive law, or newly discov-
ered facts, if the claims go to factual innocence of the 
crime itself. Powell S2257(c). The Biden Bill alters your 
approach entirely. First, new claims that could not have 
been raised due .to unconstitutional state action, new retro-
active law, or newly discove~ed facts come in regardless of 
1N6te the differenc~ bewtween a "su~cessive"_ petititon 
and a "subsequent" petition. A successive petition raises 
claims that have already been adjudicated in an earlier ha-
beas proceeding. A subsequent petition raises new claims. 
A subsequent petition may be barred as an "abuse of the 
writ" under Rule 9(b) if the petitioner should have raised 
the new claims in -=the first petition. See gene rally 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (opinion of 
Powe 11, J. ) . 
___ • • .. . .. ~, •• ,{ ... • ;-. ::~ .:-.:.};~0fi2~~£:S. '. :(::_-:;:-\.: :.. ·-~1~:~:r::.:.~ ~- ~-:...-... ,.-,._:_~ . .,~. '~-- ... '..~/-; :-- -··~, --__ •~·/· ~--:· -:·-~·~~.=~ii4f.~~~~----
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whether they involve factual innocence. Second, claims that 
involve factual innocence come in regardless of whether they 
involve any new facts or law. This means that successive 
petitions come in so long as they involve factual innocence, 
even though they have al ready been adjudicated. Finally, 
the Biden Bill adds on a new provision, allowing subsequent 
or successive petitions any time they are needed to prevent 
"a miscarriage of justice." Biden S2257(c). 
Analysis: This change is intended to gut the finality 
mechanism of your proposal. The major goal of Biden's 
changes is to allow challenges to the sentence as well as to 
guilt of the crime. As we have discussed, limiting subse-
quent petitions to claims of factual innocence is fair in 
light of the fact that prisoners will have had counsel to 
present challenges to the sentence at trial and on their 
first habeas petition. In view of the wide range of evi-
dence that can be mitigating, see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 
109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
( 1982), defendants- can easily . "disco:1er" new evidence _after · 
the first ~abeas proceeding, _or have new testimony fabricat~ 
ed by paid experts. ·· Affordi!lg· additional opportunities to 
challenge ~he sentencing hearirig alone also comes at a great 
cost to the State, and to the families of the murdered vic-
tims. Because the Court has required that the evidence al-
lowed at sentencing be unlimited, the sentencing hearing 
involves placing almost the entire record before another 
jury. To impose this heavy burden in a case where the de-
- 7 -
fendant has not bothered -- despite the assistance of coun-
sel -- to raise the claim the first time around is not fair 
or necessary to prevent injustice. 
The Biden Bill would allow successive petitions on the 
basis that the claim raised relates to factual innocence. 
Be aware that this test is similar to the one you proposed 
for a plurality of the Court in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
836 (1986). But your Kuhlmann test was to apply to all ha-
beas petitions, not just capital petitions where the pros-
pect for delay is greatest. Also in capital cases delay by 
definition frustrates implementation of the penalty. And 
Kuhlmann had nothing to do with a "quid pro quo" involving 
counsel and automatic stays of execution. 
The "miscarriage of justice" standard of the Biden Bill 
is vague and open-ended, and unless it is subsequently lim-
ited by the Supreme Court it could provide a wide-open door 
for successive petitions in every case. The "miscarriage of 
justice" language appears to come from discussions of proce-
dural default (not subsequent petitions) in Harris v. Reed, 
109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 478 
(1986). The meaning of the term is not clear, but the Court 
~ill soon hear :a c~se on the issue. Selvage v. Lynaugh, Mo. 
87~7600 (no argument date set). 
In sum, these changes alter the balance of the "quid 
pro quo" offered to the States. If they can expect the cur-
r~nt waive of mer i tless subsequent petitions to continue, 
why should they opt in to the new statute? 
:,,-~~~\~~~~f-~<;~'.:··i~S~;. 2··: ·J:;°t~:-. L::~ .. ;; '~. -~'.-:~:-~S~,~1:l~if:-~~~::.·:·:•~~i.,~1;~~:)~~::':\}~,---~fl:')~~I--·~-:;;::1::-i: ~- '. ·--~;\·L:: ,_. ~L. 
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4. Limitations Period -- One Year 
As we expected, the Biden Bill lengthens the limita-
tions period from six months to one year. It also allows a 
90-day extension for good cause instead of a 60-day exten-
sion. 
Analysis: There is not much to add here except to say 
that 6 months is longer than provided for any appeal in our 
legal system. No more than 6 months is needed for fairness. 
a. Cert Petitions from State Habeas 
Your proposal would not toll the limitations period 
while the petitioner seeks cert in the United States Supreme 
Court from state collateral proceedings. 
The Biden Bill would. Biden S2258(b). 
Powell S2258 ( b). 
~ 
Analysis: As the Committee report stated, only two of 
the over 100 modern capital cases decided by the Court came 
from state habeas. And the Supreme Court can always address 
any claims on review of the federal habeas proceeding. The 
Bi den change produces needless delay. But this is not a 
major point~ and -~ would not spend ~uch time on ~it. 
5. ~rocedural Default and Exhaustion 
Under. y·our proposal, the federal habeas court will hear 
only claims· that were raised in the state proceeding. Your 
proposal does allow a federal habeas court to immediately 
hear claims not presented in state court where the failure 
to develop a claim in the state courts was due to unconsti-
tutional state action, the recognition of a retroactively 
applicable new federal right, or new facts that could not 
.,:__:~- -i~~~~:; .. ~~~~~- · - ...... ·:·.·.·.·.·~\:; .. :<y.· •·:,:~,~:/i~f\·~~::~·· ..~,jLti.i;,~~J4Mfill§~&~~g{t:{!~l.½~l5:-:t~f;~~~~~ ~I~~w:r~:\~~:.:~:;·~-
.· 
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have been discovered previously. But for claims that do not 
fall within these categories, the prisoner cannot return to 
state court for exhaustion in the hope of raising the claims 
in a subsequent federal petition. Powell S2259. Your pro-
posal thus changes the current law with respect to exhaus-
tion, which does not allow a federal habeas court to hear 
claims not presented to the state courts in any ci rcum-
stances, but allows a prisoner to exhaust the claims and 
then return to federal court. 
(1982). 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 
Your proposal does not alter the present rules concern-
ing procedurally defaulted claims. Under Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), a claim that is procedurally 
, . 
barred under state law will not be heard on federal habeas 
unless the prisoner shows "cause and prejudice" as defined 
in cases such as Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) and 
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). 
The Biden Bill changes S2259 in an effort to alter the 
law of ·_procedural default_· in favor of prisone.rs' .. [Oddly, 
the Biden change does not ,address exhaustion_ at .all. Per-
baPs the staffer who drafted the change did not understan~ 
the difference between the two.) Under the Biden Bill, the 
federal court "may" refuse to consider a claim that has been 
procedurally defaulted in state court. But the federal 
court "shall" hear the claim regardless of the default if 
the prisoner shows that "the failure to raise the claim in a 
State court was due to the ignorance or neglect of the pris-
···-- :.~~.;;:.~ ':: -~-:. ~-~:>.~ ~-~i: :· ,:-., ... _ -~~---l ~[E-' ~:.:.~~:: ::~:. ,.:-~~-.,~~~-:..-.-:~ -~g-.. · ~[i -~;-~ ·_ ~-~ :~):~:~:;·2~~{1=:,;·-~::~:.£': .. ;_;__=--:· 
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oner or counsel or if the failure to consider such a claim 
would result in a miscarriage of justice." See Biden 
S2259(c). As discussed above, the "miscarriage of jutice" 
language is drawn from recent procedural default cases, but 
has not been defined. 
Analysis: Again, the Biden change substantially disfa-
vors the States, giving them a further disincentive to use 
the new statute. The Biden change would appear to resurrect 
the "knowing bypass" rule of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963). Under Fay, a procedurally defaulted claim will be 
heard in f~deral court unless it can be shown the prisoner 
knew of the claim and deliberately chose not to present it. 
The Biden Bill achieves the same result by making "ignorance 
or neglect" a basis for avoiding the State's procedural de-
fault rule. For the reasons stated in the Wainwright v. 
Sykes opinion that you joined, resurrection of the Fay v. 
Noia standard would be a disaster in terms of finality and 
judicial efficiency. This change would leave a State that 
opts into _ the "reform." statute worse -otf than it is under 
current law. Again, Biden's cha~ge makes the statute worth-
less from the State's point of view. 
6. Retroactivity -- Repealing Teague 
As you know, the Court last term adopted Justice Har-
lan's approach to retroactivity. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060 (1989). Under this approach, new constitutional rules 
will not (with narrow exceptions) be applied on federal ha-
beas where the petitioner's conviction became final before 
~:~~~~{:~ -~~-~~~~:\_::i?J.1I'.~:-·~,r: 1:>. . ', -.>....~2~ ~-~ ~ <:, .. ~~<:,:_~ ;_:~-~~Ah);,~:kLt.· . tli::.:i\:~:i-•::~<}i::;~ ·,~~~5::~~-~~~- '; ... -~ .. ~ ·_:. 2.:_~<·. : . 
the new rule was adopted. 
465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) 
- 11 -
As you said in Solem v. Stumes, 
(Powell, J., concurring in judg-
ment), "Review on habeas to determine that the conviction 
rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the 
time of conviction is all that is required to 'forc[e) trial 
and appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark.'" 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, the Court held that Teague ap-
plies to capital cases. 
The Biden Bill gratuitously adds a new S2262 that would 
repeal Teague in capital cases. Under S2262, habeas peti-
tioners will get the advantage of new rules if the court 
finds "in light of the purpose to be served by the change, 
the extent of reliance on previous law by law enforcement 
authorities, and the effect on the administration of jus-
tice, that it would be just to give the prisoner the benefit 
of the interim change in the law." 
Analysis: Section 2262 would essentially restore the 
retroactivity analysis of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
· ( 1965). I will not recount all the - reasons that you have 
previ-ously given -for the . super tori ty of Justice Harlan's 
rule. The· main point is that h·abeas should not become a 
"time machine" by which the prisoner constantly brings the 
legality of his sentence "up to date" by challenging it on 
the basis of new law made long after his conviction became 
final. Moreover, there is no reason for a statutory change 
in the retroactivi ty rule. Courts have long administered 
retroactivity analysis and have a far better knowledge of 
;~~~~~it¥j~~~~1?:1~~t~~Gl~JJyi~~~1-~;·:f -~-~:~n:~}!·t~-?~ .-: _ ~ ;:~ -~~~h~~~:'X tm}~~~}~i~f~f l~~::l:-~/:·.:_~~~~%:J;~;1~~::F~::;tYi:;~i~~rf ;_ 
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what works and what doesn't. The Biden change needlessly 
overrules a new decision that is important to the States. 
Capital cases are the most important area for application of 
Teague, as prisoners attempt to frustrate execution of the 
sentence every year by obtaining "holds" for Supreme Court 
cases that may establish new rules. 
proposed statute less attractive to 
likely to remain on the books unused. 
Conclusion 
Again, this makes the 
the States, and more 
Ron Klain, Biden's Chief Counsel, tells me that Biden's 
changes will look "minor" compared to those the ACLU and ABA 
have in mind. But that is no reason to support these 
changes. The danger here is that Congress will pass a di-
luted "Biden Bill," and then pat itself on the back for hav-
ing reformed capital habeas. There will not be sufficient 
political pressure to do anything more for years to come. 
But the Biden Bill will be unattractive to the States, and 
will bring no change to the present situation. In fact, a 
State that opted in to the Biden statute would find itself 
in a worse si'tua·tion· than exists today. I urge that you 
ta~tfully convey the message · t6 Senator Biden that his 
changes will "kill the goose that lays the golden egg" by 
taking away all benefit for the States. It would be far 
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TO MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC CO.MMI'l"l'EE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
IN CAPITAL CASES 
Dear Judges: 
I enclose an extract from the final draft of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee report. It proposes: 
(1) Make no change regarding successive writs. 
Retain Sanders limits on res judicata effect of 
prior writ adjudications. 
(2) "Codify and clarify" Teague/Penry rules on 
retroactivity. 
(a) Add "clearly foreshadowed" to Justice 
Harlan's two-part test. 
(b) Add an exception for Brady-type material. 
I had understood the comments on habeas corpus in the 
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1 review of the disposition of grievances ... by a person or entity not under the 
2 direct supervisions or direct control of the institution" (emphases added). 
3 
4 Under the committee proposal, the prisoner would be required to 
5 exhaust state administrative remedies as long as a federal court decided that 
6 the remedies provided by the state were both "fair and effective" without 
7 resort to any minimum standards. From a legal and pragmatic perspective, 
8 the failure of a state administrative remedy to contain any one of the minimal 
9 standards delineated in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e would appear to be fatal to a 
1 O judicial finding that the remedy in question is fair and effective," when the 
1 1 administrative litigation must occur with context and confines of an adult 
1 2 correctional facility. The absence of any one of the present statutory 
1 3 minimum standards or its substantial equivalent would undoubtedly deprive 
1 4 the state prisoner of an "opportunity to fully and fairly litigate" his claim in 
l S the state's administrative process. 
1 6 
1 7 In the event that any change in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e is warranted, the 
1 8 committee should recommend only that, where the state administrative 
1 9 remedy is not "in substantial compliance" with the minimum standards of 42 
2 0 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e (b), there will be a rebuttable presumption that the 
2 1 administrative remedy is not "plain, speedy, and effective." To overcome this 
2 2 presumption, the state will be allowed to persuade either a federal court or the 
2 3 Attorney General that its remedy contains alternate procedures which 
2 4 accomplish the same objectives as those addressed by the minimum standards 
2 S and is, in fact, a "plain, speedy, and effective" administrative remedy which 
2 6 the prisoner must exhaust prior to federal resolution of the Section 1983 claim. 
2 7 D. State Prisoner Habeas Corpus Petitions in Federal Courts 
2 s I 54-59 1 
29 
30 
Habeas corpus petitions, particularly those from state prisoners, 
. constitute a substantial portion of the federal courts' caseload. The 537 habeas 
corpus petitions filed in 1945 grew to 9,867 in 1988 - an increase of 1,840 
, 




33 the law or procedure of h.ibeas corpus, in part because Congress is currently , ~ 
3 4 considering the recommendations of the Judicial Conference's Ad Hoc 
3 5 Committee on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences and the American 

















OF DELEGATES Will CONSIDER THE REPORT FEB. 12-13.) Congress's response to those 
recommendations may have an effect beyond death penalty cases. 
DOES THE COMMITTEE WANT TO HIGHLIGHT ANY THINGS FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER··t.g., 
8.JMINATING TIME-CONSUMING PROCEDURAL HURDLES, REQUIRING RIGHT TO COUNSa IN NON-DEATH 
PENAL TY CASES? 
While eschewing major proposals, the Committee has three 
recommendations of a less sweeping nature: 
L Congress should make no change regarding the standards for hearing 
sute prisoners' successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 
Sanders v. United States (1963) established the present rules governing 
the hearing of successive petitions. Under Sanders, federal courts I!'ay give 
':_Ontrolling weight to the denial of a prior habw corpus application only if (1) 
the same ground was presented and decided adversely to the petitioner, (2) 
the prior decision was on the merits, and (3) reaching the merits of the 
subsequent application would not serve "the ends of justice." When grounds 














reach the merits unless the petitioner has deliberately abused the writ or , _ -
motion remedy. These rules have been controversial from their inception. ,. . 
Legislative efforts to overrule Sanders failed in 1966. Instead Con·gress 
codified Sanders's holding in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. A later effort to overrule .. . 
Sanders by rule was similarly unsuccessful, and the Court has ·rejected 
2 3 suggestions to change the decisional law. 
2 4 The Committee believes that no change is needed. Efforts to change 




successive petitions that needlessly undermine state interests in the finali_ty 
of convictions. It is true that many prisoners file more than one petition, but 








1 it does not appear that the federal courts have great difficulty disposing of 
2 them. They usually dispose of successive petitions summarily and without 
3 reported opinion, apparently applying the rules as if they incorporated a res 
4 judicata principle. Courts thus turn aside successive unmeritorious petitions 
5 routinely without significant expenditure of judicial effort. At the same time, 
6 the broad formulation in terms of "abuse of the writ" and "the ends of 
hv~~~~ · 
7 justice" provides judges with sufficient flexibility to reach the merits in those 
I\. 
8 cases that do appear to warrant further examination. Finally, the Supreme 
9 Court last year eliminated the main gr9unds for these successive petitions -
1 0 ch~ges in law that give rise to new claims or strengthen or revive old ones 
1 1 (Teape t,. Lane and Penry v. Lynaugh). In §3, below, we propose ~at 
1 2 Congress codify and clarify these decisions. 
1 3 2. Congress should make no change in the law respecting fact-finding 
1 4 procedures in habeas corpus cases. 
1 5 The Committee also examined proposals to restrict further district 






Sain (1963) established when courts must hold evidentiary hearings to make 
independent fact findings in habeas corpus cases. In 1966, Congress amended 
I,,. .... • 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 to establish new guidelines for when state court findings 
should be presumed correct. Opponents of the current law believe that 
federal courts are wasting valuable time holding hearings to find facts that 
2 2 the state courts have already found. They have proposed restricting federal 
2 3 evidentiary hearings to those few cases in which the state court hearing was 
2 4 not "full and fair," or abolishing federal fact-finding altogether and making 






1 Such changes are unnecessary because, as a factual matter, federal 
2 courts hold evidentiary hearings in very few habeas corpus cases. In both 
3 1987 and 1988, only 1.1 percent of the petitions filed were terminated after a 
4 trial. Habeas corpus cases are less likely than other civil cases to go to trial 
S because most judges grant a hearing only if tne state court proceedings were 
6 not full and fair. The data suggest that this is a direct result of the 1966 
7 amendments. Accordingly, we see little need for congressional intervention. 
8 3. Congress should codify IN §2254(0)(1)? and clarify recent Supreme Court 
9 decisions involving the retroactive use of new federal law in habeas corpus 
1 0 petitions. 
1 1 Retroactivity has been particularly sensitive in habeas corpus: If the 
1 2 state provided procedures that protected a defendant's constitutional rights as 
1 3 then understood, but a federal court later decides that the Constitution 
1 4 requires new or different procedures, should the state be required to release 
l S the prisoner and hold a second trial that complies with the new law? 
1 6 In 1989, the Supreme Court dramatically changed the law, holding that 
. ,' . .• . J -.i . 
1 7 prisoners may not seek habeas corpus relief based on changes in _ l~w 
1 8 occurring after their convictions. (Teague i:,. Lane and Penry v. iynaugh}. 
. ,; 








• "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be 
applicable to those cases which have become final before the 
new rules are announced." 
! 
.£ 
a rule is "new" if it was not "dictated by prior precedent" - even .,. . 
' if the rule was already followed in every state. (A "new rule," 
























Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's conviction becomes 
final.) 
retroactivity is a threshold inquiry that the court must address 
before it considers the merits; 
there are two exceptions to the g~eral prohibition: a petitioner 
may base a claim on "new law" if the claim is (1) that certain 
conduct or a certain kind of punishment is beyond the authority 
of the criminal law to proscribe, or (2) that the absence of a 
particular procedure substantially diminishes the likelihood of 
an accurate verdict. . 
The Committee recommends that Congress codify these decisions but 
clarify certain ambiguities in the law they made, and add a third exception to 
the two recognized by the Court. Congress successfully codified several then-
recent Supreme Court habeas decisions in 1966; congressional action will be 
equally helpful now. '- . 
Specifically, the Committee recommends that Congress: 
.,,;. ~ 
1 7 a. authorize federal courts to hear a habeas corpus petition only if it presents a ,., 
1 8 claim that was either controlled or "clearly foreshadowed" by existi.ng 
1 9 Supreme Court precedenl 
2 0 Teague and Penry rest on the premise that the interests of the pri~ner 
2 1 are at their weakest, and those of the state at their strongest, when the state 
. . ./ ~- .. 
2 2 courts correctly applied law that was good at the time, even if it is goo~ no 
2 3 longer. The state courts did all that could fairly be asked of them by properly . . 
2 4 applying the law as it stood during the trial and appeal. According to this 
2 5 premise, there is no possibility, furthermore, that the threat of a subsequent 
. . . ~ . "' 
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1 federal habus proceeding will deter state courts from ignoring federal 
2 constitutional rights; to expect otherwise is to assume that the threat of a 
3 habeas proceeding will prompt courts to foresee a change in the law. 
4 It may be sensible in principle to limit habeas corpus to claims that the 
S state courts had incorrectly applied existing law. But it is not easy in practice 
6 to distinguish between "misreading existing law" and "making new law." 
, 7 The Committee believes the "clearly foreshadowed" standard will encour~ge 
8 state courts to attend to case law developments as part of their duty to 
9 interpret the Constitution faithfully. On the other hand, it will not penalize 
1 0 them in habeas proceedings for failing to be prescient. We are confident that 
11 the courts will be able to administer this standard, even though its precise 
1 2 contours will require further development through adjudication. 













b. leave to the court's discretion whether to address the merits of the claim, ·· 
depending on whether they can be separated from the retroadivity question. 
It will often be difficult to separate the retroactivity issue from the merits. · In 
addition, the issues in habeas petitions are often not clearly formulated 
.... . · ,,.. ... : 
because the pleadings are usually prepared by the inmate. Issues that ·have 
been formulated clearly by the time the case reaches the Supreme Court ·ue ,· .. 
seldom so in the lower courts. 
\ .. 
c. In addition to the two exceptions announced by the Court, also excep_t from · 
',.f <, ' 
the general prohibition the kind of claim that is not feasible to raise in an ' · 
•• • /.'°I ' 
appeal from the judgment under which the applicant is in custody. Some - . --
claims are unlikely to be raised on direct appeal, for example, claims··. of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and claims that turn on facts that : are .: . . , -- -




















withheld evidence before trial. After Teague and Penry, however, such 
claims can no longer be raised in habeas corpus proceedings if they argue for a 
change in the law. An exception to the rule of retroactivity is thus needed ? 
here for the same reason the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to 
the mootness doctrine for claims that are "capable of repetition yet evading 
review." 
REFERENCES: 
Penry i,. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) 
SiJndtrs i,. U.S., 373 U.S. 1 (1963) 
Teague i,. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) 
Townsend i,. SiJin, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) 
In Part n, see also: 
For further analysis, see Part m at 




should aeate a National State-Federal Judicial Council. 
136-137 
The Committee endorses the suggestion of the Chair of the Conference 
2 0 of Chief Justices for the creation of a national State-Federal Council, composed 
2 1 of an equal number of state and federal judges, to study and submit 
2 2 recommendations to ease friction and promote cooperative action between 
2 3 the two court systems. Areas in which it might offer recommendations are 
2 4 readily apparent. Our proposals above, for example, hardly exhausted the 
2 5 problems created by complex litigation that · presents claims concurrently in 
2 6 several federal and state courts. Problems of trial scheduling often create 
2 7 friction. Attorney discipline in state and federal courts is often uncoordinated. 
2 8 These are but a few of the areas in which the proposed council might offer 
